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The tobacco, asbestos, and fossil fuel industries, among others, have 
misled the public about the dangers posed by their products by lying 
about the science behind the products. Individuals harmed by these 
misrepresentations should be able to sue for fraud. Plaintiffs in fraud 
cases of this kind—where the misrepresentation pertains to scientific 
knowledge—face far greater obstacles to proving falsity, a required 
fraud element, than do typical fraud plaintiffs. Accordingly, a different 
falsity standard should apply in such cases. This Article answers three 
questions about how that standard should be crafted and applied. First, 
how should a court determine if a case before it is one to which this 
new standard should apply? Second, how should the court determine 
what knowledge the scientific community held at a given time for the 
purpose of assessing the truthfulness or falsity of a statement or 
omission? And third, how should courts compare that baseline truth 
with the defendant’s statement or omission to determine falsity? 
Answering these questions should help make it possible for those 
harmed by scientific knowledge fraud to obtain relief. 
INTRODUCTION 
The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it, ignorance may 
deride it, but in the end, there it is. 
—Winston Churchill 
everal states’ attorneys general and the Security Exchange 
Commission (SEC) are investigating Exxon Mobil 
Corporation,1 the world’s largest oil company,2 for misleading the 
public about climate change over the past four decades.3 ExxonMobil’s 
1 In 1998, the Exxon Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation signed a $80 billion merger 
agreement forming a new company called ExxonMobil Corporation, the largest company in 
the world at the time. Allen R. Myerson, Big Oil: The Overview; Exxon and Mobil Announce 
$80 Billion Deal to Create World’s Largest Company, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 1998), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/02/business/big-oil-overview-exxon-mobil-announce-
80-billion-deal-create-world-s-largest.html. This Article will refer to the company post-
merger as “ExxonMobil,” and premerger as “Exxon.”
2 See Lauren Debter, The World’s Largest Oil and Gas Companies 2016: Exxon Is Still 
King, FORBES (May 26, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurengensler/2016/ 
05/26/global-2000-worlds-largest-oil-and-gas-companies/#7d8e87d228b6. 
3 Ivan Penn, California to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate-Change 
Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-
global-warming-20160120-story.html; John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fraud Inquiry Said to 
S 
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alleged actions closely resemble schemes carried out by the tobacco, 
asbestos, pesticide, leaded gasoline, and fracking industries.4 
Regardless of the kind of industry, the scheme is always the same: the 
company has a product that is both profitable and harmful. The 
company then tells the public that the science linking the product to the 
harm is unsettled, when in fact the science is well established, if not 
overwhelmingly settled on the matter.5 Typically, these companies are 
Focus More on Future than Past, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/20/science/exxon-mobil-fraud-inquiry-said-to-focus-more-on-future-than-
past.html. 
4 See, e.g., PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON 
TRIAL (1985); NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A 
HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO 
GLOBAL WARMING 14, 24, 33 (2010); Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil Is King, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1633–38 (2017); Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories 
of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 
33 (2003); William R. Freudenburg et al., Scientific Certainty Argumentation Methods 
(SCAMs): Science and the Politics of Doubt, 78 SOC. INQUIRY 2, 11–16 (2008); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Reaching Equilibrium in Tobacco Litigation, 62 S.C. 
L. REV. 67, 70–75 (2010); Martha McCabe, Pesticide Law Enforcement: A View from the
States, 4 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 35, 51 (1989); Jerome O. Nriagu, Clair Patterson and Robert
Kehoe’s Paradigm of “Show Me the Data” on Environmental Lead Poisoning, 78 ENVTL.
RES. 71, 71–77 (1998); Elise Gelinas, Comment, Asbestos Fraud Should Lead to Fairness:
Why Congress Should Enact the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 MD. L. REV.
162 (2009); Lynne Peeples, Fracking Industry Distorts Science to Deceive Public and
Policymakers, Says Watchdog Group, HUFFPOST (Feb. 21, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/21/fracking-research-deceive_n_6724162.html (updated Dec.
6, 2017); Jamie Lincoln Kitman, The Secret History of Lead, NATION (Mar. 2, 2000),
https://www.thenation.com/article/secret-history-lead/.
5 Recently, other such schemes have come to light. For instance, the sugar industry paid 
researchers affiliated with Harvard to publish papers downplaying the link between sugar 
and heart disease and obesity, directing blame instead to saturated fat. Cristin E. Kearns et 
al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research, JAMA INTERNAL MED., Sept. 
2016, at E1, E2, E4, http://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/article-
abstract/2548255. The sugar industry’s misinformation campaign shaped fifty years of 
health policy in the United States. Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted the 
Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/ 
well/eat/how-the-sugar-industry-shifted-blame-to-fat.html?mcubz=3&_r=0. Similarly, a 
2016 New York Times article revealed that Coca-Cola paid millions of dollars for research 
downplaying the link between sugary drinks and obesity. Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola 
Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for Obesity Away from Bad Diets, N.Y. TIMES: WELL 
(Aug. 9, 2015, 5:25 PM), https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-
scientists-who-shift-blame-for-obesity-away-from-bad-diets/. Even more recently, the 
Missouri Attorney General filed a lawsuit against three opioid drug manufacturers, seeking 
hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, alleging that the companies funded a “campaign 
of fraud and deception” by misleading doctors and consumers about opioids’ addictiveness 
and adverse health effects. Katie Mettler, In Lawsuit, Missouri Says Big Pharma Caused 
Opioid Crisis with “Campaign of Fraud and Deception,” WASH. POST (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/06/22/in-lawsuit-missouri-
says-big-pharma-caused-opioid-crisis-with-campaign-of-fraud-and-deception/?utm_term= 
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aware their message does not square with what scientists know. In other 
words, these assertions of scientific doubt are, at best, misleading. 
Such distortions may, if all the elements are met, constitute fraud.6 
But, in order to prove falsity in these cases, plaintiffs face obstacles that 
typical fraud plaintiffs do not,7 because science, by its very nature, can 
be and often is misleadingly characterized as uncertain.8 For a number 
.d7265fe9beb5. Similar lawsuits have been filed in Mississippi and Ohio. Jerry Mitchell, 
Mississippi Sets Tone as Opioid Drugmakers Face Rising Tide of Lawsuits, 
CLARION-LEDGER (June 10, 2017), http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2017/06/11/ 
mississippi-sets-tone-opioid-drugmakers-face-rising-tide-lawsuits/346518001/ (updated 
June 12, 2017, 4:58 PM); Efthimios Parasidis, A Look Inside Ohio’s Lawsuit Against Opioid 
Manufacturers, SALON (July 7, 2017, 7:59 AM), http://www.salon.com/2017/07/07/a-look-
inside-ohios-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers_partner/. 
6 As used in this Article, the term “fraud” encompasses common law fraud, 
misrepresentation, deceit, securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, truth in lending laws, truth 
in advertising laws, and any other fraud or fraud-like claim or defense that has as one of its 
elements that the wrongdoer made a false representation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) 
(federal mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (federal wire fraud); CAL. CORP. CODE § 
25401 (West 2016) (California securities fraud); FLA. STAT. § 517.301 (2018) (Florida 
securities fraud); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352, 353 (McKinney 2016) (New York securities 
fraud); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33-1 (West 2016) (Texas securities fraud); SEC 
Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (federal securities fraud); West v. JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 295 (Ct. App. 2013) (California common law fraud); 
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hoy, 136 So. 3d 647, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Florida 
common law fraud); Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Tilton, 48 N.Y.S.3d 98, 105 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (New York common law fraud); Zaidi v. Shah, 502 S.W.3d 434, 441 
(Tex. App. 2016) (Texas common law fraud). 
7 A required element of fraud is that the defendant made a statement or omission that 
misrepresented a material fact. See, e.g., Nichols v. Costa, 794 F. Supp. 165, 168 (W.D. Pa. 
1992) (holding that to state a fraud claim under Pennsylvania law, a “plaintiff must allege 
. . . a false representation of existing fact”); In re 80 Nassau Assocs., 169 B.R. 832, 841 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a “fraud claim requires the plaintiff to plead and prove 
(1) a misrepresentation, (2) of a material fact, (3) that was false . . .”); Anglo Am. Sec. Fund,
L.P. v. S.R. Glob. Int’l Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143, 158 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that the first
element of a common law fraud claim in Delaware is “a false representation of fact (or
material omission) by the defendant”).
8 Part of the problem is that scientific theories, like all theories, are “under-
determinative,” meaning any body of evidence always has more than one theory that can, in 
principle, accommodate it. See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POPPER 120 (Jeremy 
Shearmur & Geoffrey Stokes eds., 2016). For example, the conclusion “objects near earth 
fall toward it when dropped” might be opposed by “objects near earth fall toward it when 
dropped but only when one checks to see that they do.” Since one may append this to any 
conclusion, all conclusions are, at least technically speaking, underdeterminative. For a 
more in-depth exploration of underdetermination in scientific knowledge theory, see Kyle 
Stanford, Underdetermination of Scientific Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Winter 
2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/. Another problem is 
that scientific theories (like all theories) are never fully consistent with all available 
evidence. See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of 
Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 
531 (2004) (applying Popper’s and Kuhn’s theories to existing debates within the legal 
2019] Scientific Knowledge Fraud 311
of reasons, it is easy to raise scientific doubt. After all, scientific 
knowledge generally cannot be labeled as categorically true or false.9 
Moreover, numerous widely held prejudices and misconceptions about 
science are easy to exploit.10 For decades, corporate, political, and 
religious entities have exploited these prejudices and misconceptions 
to spread misleading pseudoscientific messages that further their 
agendas.11 For instance, ExxonMobil (and its predecessor, Exxon) 
spent forty years claiming that the science behind climate change was 
“unsettled,” when in fact there was a broad consensus among climate 
scientists that CO2 emissions were causing the climate to change.12 
Most scientists would agree that ExxonMobil’s statements did not 
reflect the knowledge held by the scientific community (or, for that 
matter, by the company) at the time the statements were made.13 Does 
community about scientific evidence); Stephanie Tai, Uncertainty About Uncertainty: The 
Impact of Judicial Decisions on Assessing Scientific Uncertainty, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
671, 675–77 (2009) (discussing scientific uncertainty, including Popper’s and Kuhn’s 
theories, in the context of judicial, legislative, and administrative decision-making). 
9 See Carl J. Wenning, Scientific Epistemology: How Scientists Know What They Know, 
J. PHYSICS TCHR. EDUC. ONLINE, Autumn 2009, at 3, 4 (noting that because science deals
with truths we cannot know subjectively for ourselves, such as the fact Earth is round or that
it spins on its axis, “[i]t appears that knowledge is to some extent a justified belief ”); Bert
Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific
Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994).
10 See, e.g., Understanding Science: How Science Really Works, U.C.: UNDERSTANDING 
SCI., http://undsci.berkeley.edu/teaching/misconceptions.php. (last visited May 23, 2018) 
(listing more than two dozen misconceptions the public holds about what science is and how 
it works); David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI. 
EVIDENCE 37, 47–50 (3d ed. 2011) (articulating several “myths” about science and their 
corresponding “facts”). 
11 For instance, leaded gasoline was one product companies peddled to the public using 
false scientific data. See C. Boyden Gray & Andrew R. Varcoe, Octane, Clean Air, and 
Renewable Fuels: A Modest Step Toward Energy Independence, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 9, 
15–26 (2005). Other such products include, for instance, artificial sweeteners, see Jason 
Iuliano, Comment, Killing Us Sweetly: How to Take Industry Out of the FDA, 6 J. FOOD L. 
& POL’Y 31, 46–71 (2010), trans fats, see Ross Williams, Comment, Safe but Not 
Wholesome: The Troubling State of Trans Fat Regulation, 3 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 39, 46–51 
(2007), and Thalidomide, see Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a 
False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2156–57 (1997). There are many 
others. 
12 See Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change 
Communications (1977–2014), ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Aug. 2017, http://iopscience.iop.org/ 
article/10.1088/1748-9326/aa815f/pdf (noting that, based on a review of 187 climate 
communications from ExxonMobil, the company’s climate change denial message to the 
public conflicted not only with the scientific community’s knowledge but with the findings 
of its own scientists). 
13 See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, Global Warming Has Begun, Expert Tells Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 24, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-
begun-expert-tellssenate.html. 
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that mean they were false? Many, including a growing number of 
states’ attorneys general and civil plaintiffs, argue the answer is yes.14 
Under the law, however, the answer is far from clear. Indeed, proving 
a science-is-unsettled statement to be legally false is very difficult. In 
most cases, defendants can show that a statement asserting scientific 
uncertainty was not technically false, even though it was calculated to 
mislead.15 Accordingly, although ExxonMobil’s statements were 
calculated to mislead, and in fact did, because the statements pertained 
to scientific knowledge—as opposed to, say, finance—they were likely 
not false for the purposes of fraud. ExxonMobil’s statements are a good 
example of how well-funded corporate defendants, like Big Oil, Big 
Tobacco, and Big Sugar, get away with spreading misleading 
messages. As a result, the scale is tipped heavily in favor of well-
funded corporate defendants in scientific knowledge fraud cases.16  
To level the playing field, I proposed a new falsity standard for 
scientific knowledge fraud cases in Peddling Ignorance: A New Falsity 
Standard for Scientific Knowledge Fraud Cases.17 Stated simply, the 
standard is as follows: “A statement or omission that misrepresents 
knowledge held by the scientific community at the time such statement 
or omission was made fulfills the falsity element of a fraud claim.”18 
This standard would apply only to falsity, not to knowledge, intent, 
or any other element of fraud. Accordingly, this Article will address 
only falsity; all other elements and considerations, including damages, 
causation, and standing, are beyond the scope of this Article. In 
addition, the proposal that statements like those made by ExxonMobil 
should be prohibited raises important First Amendment concerns.19 
14 See infra note 27 (listing pending lawsuits against and investigations into fossil fuel 
companies for misleading the public about climate change). 
15 Wes E. Henricksen, Peddling Ignorance: A New Falsity Standard for Scientific 
Knowledge Fraud Cases, 86 UMKC L. REV. 295, 330 (2017). 
16 Scientific knowledge fraud was first recognized as its own distinct category of fraud 
in Peddling Ignorance: A New Falsity Standard for Scientific Knowledge Fraud Cases. 
Fraud, however, is only one avenue for holding liable those who mislead the public about 
the science behind their products. The standard proposed and discussed herein may also be 
helpful in holding such defendants liable in other kinds of actions, such as those brought 
under consumer protection, truth in advertising, and racketeering laws.  
17 Henricksen, supra note 15. 
18 Id. at 342. Due to the nature of group knowledge, and group scientific knowledge in 
particular, an alternative wording of the statement might add the following emphasized 
words: a statement or omission that misrepresents the state of the knowledge held by the 
scientific community at the time such statement or omission was made fulfills the falsity 
element of a fraud claim. 
19 See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 
(2018) (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)) (holding that 
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These constitutional issues, meriting exploration, are also outside the 
scope of this Article. The purpose of this Article is solely to propose a 
new fraud-falsity standard for scientific knowledge fraud cases. 
Before any court can adopt and apply the proposed standard, three 
key questions must be addressed:  
1. What constitutes a scientific knowledge fraud case?
2. How should courts determine what knowledge the scientific
community held at a given time—that is, the baseline truth—
when assessing the truthfulness or falsity of a given statement?
3. What considerations should courts take into account when
comparing that baseline truth with the defendant’s statement?
This Article attempts to answer these questions. 
Authors have addressed how greenhouse gas emitters, like 
ExxonMobil, might be held liable for climate change damages under 
nuisance law,20 but few have done so with regard to fraud, and none 
have addressed the falsity element.21 This Article aims to fill that gap 
in the scholarship. More broadly, it also attempts to contribute to the 
scholarship concerning how easy it is to mislead the public about 
science and get away with it.22 Courts, Congress, and scholars have 
governments have “no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content”); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (holding, 
in a plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy, that false statements generally are not a 
new category of unprotected speech exempt from the normal prohibition on content-based 
restriction). 
20 See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 300 n.22 (citing several law journal articles 
exploring the topic of climate change liability under nuisance law). 
21 See, e.g., id. at 302; Ashley Poon, An Examination of New York’s Martin Act as a Tool 
to Combat Climate Change, 44 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 115 (2017); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
On Thin Ice: Climate Change, Exxon, NYAG and the Martin Act, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 19, 2015, 
2:00 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202742773121/on-thin-ice-
climate-change-exxon-nyag-and-the-martin-act/; JENNIFER KLEIN, COLUMBIA LAW SCH.: 
SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS FOR 
FAILURE TO PREPARE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 15–23 (2015), http://wordpress.ei.columbia. 
edu/climate-change-law/files/2016/06/Klein-2015-08-Liability-US-Gov-Failure-to-Prep 
Climate-Change.pdf; Chris Erickson, Climate Change Regulation Through Litigation: New 
York’s Investigation of ExxonMobil Under the Martin Act, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 
(Feb. 4, 2017), http://www.mjeal-online.org/climate-change-regulation-through-litigation-
new-yorks-investigation-of-exxonmobil-under-the-martin-act/. 
22 See, e.g., James Parker-Flynn, The Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Climate Science, 
43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11098, 11099 (2013) (“[T]he United States should 
adopt a narrowly tailored civil cause of action for the fraudulent misrepresentation of climate 
science.”); James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 295–
310 (2018) (proposing a “social epistemological solution” whereby “scientific adjuncts” 
would make conclusions of law and fact of issues involving expert witness testimony); 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901) (proposing “a board of experts or a single expert, not called 
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proposed solutions to this dilemma in a number of contexts. For 
instance, the federal courts twice, first in Frye and then in Daubert,23 
set forth guidelines to ensure that only expert witness testimony based 
on valid science is admissible in court, which was codified in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702.24 Authors have argued that new or existing 
causes of action should be created or construed to hold those who 
misrepresent science liable for such misrepresentations.25 And a 
handful of scholars have proposed structural changes to the judiciary to 
ensure that scientific experts decide conclusions of law and fact 
involving scientific issues.26 None, however, have addressed these 
issues in the context of fraud. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines what constitutes a 
scientific knowledge fraud case, delineating the category of actions 
where the fraud-falsity standard should apply. Part II addresses how 
courts should determine what knowledge the scientific community held 
at a given time for the purpose of assessing the truthfulness or falsity 
of a statement in a scientific knowledge fraud case. Part III proposes a 
framework that courts could use to more effectively and accurately 
compare that baseline truth with the defendant’s statement to determine 
falsity. 
by either side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the case 
which lie within his province” of scientific or expert knowledge); Michael Hor, When 
Experts Disagree, 2000 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 241, 261 (2000) (proposing “an expert 
tribunal to decide between competing expert generalisations” put forth by the parties); 
Elizabeth Dubats, Note, An Inconvenient Lie: Big Tobacco Was Put on Trial for Denying 
the Effects of Smoking; Is Climate Change Denial Off-Limits?, 7 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
510, 512–13 (2012) (arguing that fossil fuel companies should be shielded from fraud 
liability, but held accountable the same way tobacco companies were). 
23 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
24 FED. R. EVID. 702. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which was amended in 2000 in 
response to Daubert and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), encapsulates the current evidentiary standard. See County 
of Fresno v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660, 663 (Ct. App. 1979) (“Public policy favors 
the use of objective, highly accurate scientific analysis.”); Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 297 
(N.M. 2004) (“Scientific evidence can only assist the trier of fact if it is ‘grounded in valid, 
objective science’ and is [therefore] ‘reliable enough to prove what it purports to prove.’”); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
the party seeking admission of scientific expert testimony must present “objective, verifiable 
evidence that the testimony is based on scientifically valid principles.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
25 See, e.g., Parker-Flynn, supra note 22 (noting the inadequacy of current law, and 
positing “the United States should adopt a narrowly tailored civil cause of action for the 
fraudulent misrepresentation of climate science”); Dubats, supra note 22.  
26 See Dillon, supra note 22; Hand, supra note 22; Hor, supra note 22. 
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Courts will benefit immediately from the guidance and clarity of the 
proposed standard. To date, at least nine lawsuits have been filed 
against ExxonMobil and other fossil fuel companies alleging 
misrepresentations of climate change science.27 More are sure to come. 
In addition, other misrepresentations of scientific knowledge have 
come to light in recent years,28 spawning litigation against defendants 
27 See ExxonMobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (action 
for declaratory relief); Complaint, City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18 cv 182 (JFK)) (action based upon fundamental principle that a 
corporation that makes a product causing severe harm when used exactly as intended should 
shoulder the costs of abating that harm); Complaint, Ramirez v. ExxonMobil Corp., 334 F. 
Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 3:16-CV-03111-K) [hereinafter Complaint, Ramirez] 
(class action alleging federal securities fraud claims under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act); Amended Class Action Complaint, Fentress v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 3d 569 (S.D. Tex. 2018) (No. 16-CV-03484) (class action 
alleging claims under Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 1132); Complaint, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA) (action to recover damages from global 
warming caused by defendant’s actions under a federal common law claim of nuisance); 
Complaint, People v. BP P.L.C., No. RG17875889 (Super. Ct. Alameda Cty. Sept. 19, 2017) 
(alleging public nuisance and seeking an abatement fund to provide for infrastructure 
necessary for the people to adapt to global warming impacts such as sea level rise); 
Complaint, People v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cty. Sept. 
19, 2017) (alleging public nuisance and seeking an abatement fund to provide for 
infrastructure necessary for the people to adapt to global warming impacts such as sea level 
rise); Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), 
Inc., No. 2018CV030349 (Dist. Ct. Boulder Cty. Apr. 17, 2018) (bringing claims for 
nuisance, trespass, unjust enrichment, and violations of consumer protection laws against 
Suncor and ExxonMobil); Petition of ExxonMobil Corp., In re Civil Investigative Demand, 
No. 2016-EPD-36 (Super. Ct. Suffolk Cty. June 16, 2016), aff’d sub nom. ExxonMobil 
Corp. v. Attorney General, 94 N.E.3d 986 (Mass. 2018), cert. denied, ExxonMobil Corp. v. 
Healey, No. 18-311, 2019 WL 113105 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019) (action filed by ExxonMobil in 
response to subpoenas issued by Massachusetts Attorney General); Subpoena Duces Tecum, 
New York v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 451962/16 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Aug. 19, 
2016) (New York Attorney General subpoenas compelling ExxonMobil and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to produce documents pertaining to climate change); Verified 
Petition for Pre-Suit Depositions, In re ExxonMobil Corp., No. 096-297222-18 (Dist. Ct. 
Tarrant Cty. Jan. 8, 2018). Other parties have filed nonfraud-based claims against 
ExxonMobil for its role in climate change and sea level rise. See, e.g., Complaint, County 
of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. CIV 1702586 (Super. Ct. Marin Cty. July 17, 2017) 
(alleging nuisance, failure to warn, negligence, design defect, and trespass); Complaint, 
County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV03222 (Super. Ct. San Mateo Cty. July 
17, 2017) (alleging nuisance, failure to warn, negligence, design defect, and trespass); 
Complaint, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227 (Super Ct. Contra 
Costa Cty. July 17, 2017) (alleging nuisance, failure to warn, negligence, design defect, and 
trespass). See generally Myanna Dellinger, See You in Court: Around the World in Eight 
Climate Change Lawsuits, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 525 (2018) 
(discussing climate damages lawsuits filed in North America, Europe, and Africa). 
28 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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in other industries.29 Consequently, courts will have to determine 
whether these corporate defendants made false representations to 
shareholders, government regulators, policymakers, or the public when 
they misrepresented the science behind their products and the dangers 
those products pose.  
Moreover, the urgency of implementing a more just standard in 
scientific knowledge fraud cases is particularly great today because 
science is under attack. The current administration and Republican 
leaders have dismantled environmental regulations, gutted the EPA, 
scrubbed politically inconvenient scientific data from government 
websites, and attempted to defund scientific research and institutions.30 
Climate change denial and other anti-science initiatives, laws, and 
policies are being implemented at an alarming rate.31 By misleading 
the public on science, those in power increase their wealth and 
29 For instance, opioid manufacturers have been charged by state law enforcement 
agencies in Missouri, Mississippi, and Ohio. See Therese Apel, Mississippi Attorney 
General Joins Nationwide Effort to Push Opioid Alternatives, CLARION-LEDGER (Sept. 20, 
2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2017/09/20/mississippi-
attorney-general-insurance-opioid-alternatives/686439001/ (discussing the Mississippi 
Attorney General’s lawsuit against opioid manufacturers) (updated Sept. 20, 2017, 5:48 
PM); Richard Pérez-Peña, Ohio Sues Drug Makers, Saying They Aided Opioid Epidemic, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/us/ohio-sues-pharma 
ceutical-drug-opioid-epidemic-mike-dewine.html (discussing the Ohio Attorney General’s 
lawsuit against opioid manufacturers); Mettler, supra note 5 (discussing the Missouri 
Attorney General’s lawsuit against opioid manufacturers).  
30 See Nathanael Johnson, Trump’s EPA Is Rolling Back Another Anti-Coal Regulation, 
GRIST (Jan. 3, 2019), https://grist.org/article/trumps-epa-is-rolling-back-another-anti-coal-
regulation/ (discussing the Trump Administration’s rollback of coal environmental 
regulations); Scott Waldman, Climate Web Pages Erased and Obscured Under Trump, SCI. 
AM. (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/climate-web-pages-
erased-and-obscured-under-trump/ (discussing the Trump Administration’s scrubbing of 
large amounts of climate change and other information from the EPA website); Scott 
Waldman, Trump Budget Would Slash Science Across Agencies, SCI. AM. (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-budget-would-slash-science-across-
agencies/ (discussing how the Trump Administration’s 2018 budget proposed deep cuts to 
various scientific research projects and institutions). 
31 For example, Florida House Bill 989, which was signed into law by Governor Rick 
Scott on June 26, 2017, allows any county resident to file a complaint about instructional 
materials in the county’s public schools. H.R. 989, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017). A 
hearing officer is appointed, and a hearing is held before the hearing officer after which the 
board, if it deems the challenge justified, may remove those materials from the curriculum. 
Id. This law has been widely derided as “anti-science” because it opens the door to removing 
evolution and climate change instructional materials, among others, to those who oppose 
valid scientific teachings in school. See Marshal Shepherd, Two Sad Ironies in Florida 
Passing Its “Anti-Science” Law, FORBES (July 1, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.forbes. 
com/sites/marshallshepherd/2017/07/01/two-sad-ironies-in-florida-passing-its-anti-
science-law/#7a97fc065089. 
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influence at the expense of the health, prosperity, and security of 
everyone else.32 At the same time, society’s dependence on science, 
engineering, and technology is growing more rapidly than ever.33 
Accordingly, we need to reaffirm our commitment to objective truth by 
calling falsehoods false. 
I 
DEFINING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE FRAUD 
A. Fraud and Falsity
The elements of common law fraud are34 (1) a representation of fact; 
(2) falsity of the representation; (3) materiality of the representation;
(4) the speaker’s knowledge of the falsity of the representation, or
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of it; (5) the speaker’s intent
that the hearer rely upon it; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of
the representation; (7) the hearer’s reliance on the representation; (8)
32 While everyone suffers from big corporations getting away with misleading the public 
about science, it is the poor and middle classes that bear the greatest burden. See, e.g., Martin 
Wolf, Why Climate Change Puts the Poorest Most at Risk, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/f350020e-b206-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399 (describing how 
global warming disproportionately affects lower-income nations); Robert Reich, Climate 
and Inequality, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gON68 
n8ko0 (“The people who are bearing the brunt of climate change here and around the world 
are the poor and working-class who live in areas increasingly prone to flooding, who rely 
on croplands susceptible to ever more frequent droughts, who depend on outdated water and 
sewage systems and older roadways and power grids that are falling apart under the strains 
of more severe weather, who live in fragile structures particularly vulnerable to intensifying 
hurricanes and violent storms, whose health is especially compromised by airborne 
contaminants, infections, and other diseases that are accompanying climate change.”). 
33 See, e.g., Christine Norton, Book Review, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2006–2007) 
(reviewing ALAN I. MARCUS & AMY SUE BIX, THE FUTURE IS NOW: SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1950 (2007)) (noting that World War II was “the 
starting point of America’s realization that continued dominance in the international scene 
depends upon scientific and technological supremacy”); Stephen Breyer, The 
Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 24 (Aug. 1998) ( “[T]he law itself 
increasingly needs access to sound science. . . . [A]s society becomes more dependent for 
its well being upon scientifically complex technology, we find that this technology 
increasingly underlies legal issues of importance to all of us.”); Barack Obama, U.S. 
President, Remarks by the President at the National Academy of Sciences Annual Meeting 
(Apr. 27, 2009) (“Science is more essential for our prosperity, our security, our health, our 
environment, and our quality of life than it has ever been before.”), https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-academy-sciences-annual-
meeting. 
34 Although the proposed standard could apply to a wide range of fraud claims 
mentioned earlier in this Article, any discussion of common law fraud (or intentional 
misrepresentation or deceit) principles is meant to give guidance on fraud law generally, and 
on the falsity element specifically. 
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the hearer’s right to rely on the representation; and (9) the hearer’s 
consequent and proximate injury caused by reliance on the 
representation.35 All elements must typically be pleaded with 
heightened specificity and proven by clear and convincing evidence.36 
To satisfy the falsity element, a plaintiff must prove the defendant’s 
representation was false under the law.37 A false representation 
consists of “any oral or written words, conduct, or combination of 
words and conduct that creates an untrue or misleading impression in 
the mind of another.”38 Because knowledge and intent are separate 
35 The elements of fraud are presented in slightly different forms in different 
jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions list five elements, for instance, while others list seven, 
eight, or nine. But all jurisdictions include some version of these core fraud elements. V. 
John Ella, Common Law Fraud Claims: A Critical Tool for Litigators, BENCH & B. MINN., 
Sept. 2006, at 18, 19 (“There are many types of fraud — insurance fraud, welfare fraud, 
election fraud, healthcare fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, immigration fraud, consumer 
fraud, internet fraud, patent fraud, accounting fraud, tax fraud, and mail fraud — to name a 
few. But for the most part, all fraud-type claims have similar elements.”); see also West v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 295 (Ct. App. 2013) (California fraud 
elements: “(1) the defendant made a false representation as to a past or existing material 
fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in 
making the representation, the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff 
justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered resulting damages.”); 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Tilton, 48 N.Y.S.3d 98, 105 (App. Div. 2017) 
(New York fraud elements: “Such a claim is stated when a plaintiff pleads a material 
misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intent to induce reliance, justifiable 
reliance by the plaintiff and damages flowing therefrom.”); GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hoy, 
136 So. 3d 647, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Florida fraud elements: “1) a false statement 
concerning a material fact, 2) knowledge by the person making the statement that the 
representation is false, 3) intent by the person making the statement that the representation 
will induce another to act upon it, and 4) reliance on the representation to the injury of the 
other party”) (quoting Mettler, Inc. v. Ellen Tracy, Inc., 648 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1994)) (emphasis omitted); Zaidi v. Shah, 502 S.W.3d 434, 441 (Tex. App. 2016) 
(Texas fraud elements: “(1) the speaker made a material representation; (2) the 
representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker either knew it 
was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; 
(4) the speaker intended the plaintiff to act upon the representation; (5) the plaintiff acted in
reliance on the representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered injury thereby”).
36 See, e.g., In re Ogden, 314 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2002); Mayberry v. 
Ememessay, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 687, 698 (W.D. Va. 2002); see also 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 12 
(2018). 
37 United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 349 (1901); Turner v. Milliman, 708 S.E.2d 
766, 770 (S.C. 2011); Prestwood v. City of Andalusia, 709 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Ala. 1997); 
Adams v. Gillig, 92 N.E. 670, 671 (N.Y. 1910); Hennig v. Ahearn, 601 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1999); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 106 (2013). 
38 T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1476, 1488 (D. Colo. 1991); see 
also Church & Dwight Co. v. SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmBH, 843 F.3d 48, 65 
(2d Cir. 2016) (noting that, under the Lanham Act, “[i]f a message is not literally false, a 
plaintiff may nonetheless demonstrate that it is impliedly false if the message leaves an 
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fraud elements, the person making the representation does not need to 
know the representation is untrue or intend to mislead to prove falsity.39 
Falsity only requires the representation to be, at the time it is made, 
objectively untrue or misleading.40  
In scientific knowledge fraud cases, falsity is uniquely difficult to 
prove.41 First, science does not operate on certainties.42 This makes it 
easy for a wrongdoer to assert that the science on a particular topic is 
uncertain or unsettled, giving the impression “we don’t know,” when 
in fact scientists within that field know enough to warrant action or 
precautions, if not liability. The tobacco industry did this for half a 
century. Specifically, tobacco industry executives and affiliates told the 
public and policymakers that the scientific link between smoking and 
cancer was unclear.43 This statement, and all its permutations, was a 
impression on the listener or viewer that conflicts with reality”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
39 See Davis v. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., 965 So. 2d 1076, 1091 (Ala. 2007) (“[A] 
false representation, even if made innocently or by mistake, operates as a legal fraud if it is 
a material fact that is acted upon with belief in its truth.”); Monroe v. Mercer, 414 S.W.2d 
756, 760–61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
40 See generally Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 2009); 
Mukhopadhyay v. Genesis Corp., 894 N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Parker v. 
Byrne, 996 A.2d 627 (R.I. 2010). There are other nuances to the falsity standard this Article 
will not address, but which are relevant to the analysis herein, such as where the 
representation contains a half-truth, see United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464 
(Ky. 1999); Knights of Columbus Council 3152 v. KFS BD, Inc., 791 N.W.2d 317 (Neb. 
2010); Farnsworth v. Feller, 471 P.2d 792 (Or. 1970); Am. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Long, 
344 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 107 (2013), 
where the representation is technically accurate, yet still misleading for the purposes of a 
fraud claim, see Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wis. Nat’l Bank of Sheboygan, 12 F. Supp. 
2d 885, 890 (E.D. Wis. 1998); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 736–37 (5th ed. 1984), and where no false statement is made, but overall 
impression of representations are misleading, see Downey v. Finucane, 98 N.E. 391 (N.Y. 
1912); 37 Fraud and Deceit § 106, supra note 37; 60A LAURA HUNTER DIETZ ET AL., NEW 
YORK JURISPRUDENCE: FRAUD AND DECEIT § 121 (2d ed. 2019). 
41 Henricksen, supra note 15, at 317–33. 
42 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“Of course, it would 
be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a 
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.”). 
43 The tobacco industry’s campaign to cast doubt on the scientific link between smoking 
and cancer is well documented. See, e.g., PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKE SCREEN: THE TRUTH 
BEHIND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY COVER-UP (1996) (outlining the history of the tobacco 
industry’s attempts to escape regulation); RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S 
HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH 
OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996) (outlining the history of the tobacco industry’s attempts to escape 
regulation); ROBERT N. PROCTOR, GOLDEN HOLOCAUST: ORIGINS OF THE CIGARETTE 
CATASTROPHE AND THE CASE FOR ABOLITION (2012). The tobacco industry’s scientific 
misrepresentations have also become well known in popular culture. See, e.g., THANK YOU 
FOR SMOKING (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2006); ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 4. One 
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lie.44 But it worked. By convincing millions of people there was 
genuine doubt about the link between smoking and cancer, the tobacco 
industry increased sales, causing millions of deaths and chronic and 
acute illnesses.45 The tobacco industry’s false statement also evaded 
fraud laws because, although the message misled the public, it was not 
legally false.46  
Second, due to the lack of absolute objectivity and certainty in 
scientific research, a great number of people have misconceptions 
about science—like how the scientific method works and what a 
“theory” is.47 Many biases, based on religious, social, political, or 
financial conflicts of interests, also warp people’s conception of 
scientific assertions.48 Because of these misunderstandings and biases, 
now-famous tobacco industry memorandum from 1969 stated the industry’s goal explicitly: 
“Doubt is our product.” Rahul Kanakia, Tobacco Companies Obstructed Science, History 
Professor Says, STAN. NEWS SERV. (Feb. 13, 2007), http://news.stanford.edu/pr/2007/pr-
proctor-021407.html. 
44 See Harms of Cigarette Smoking and Health Benefits of Quitting, NAT’L CANCER 
INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/tobacco/cessation-fact-
sheet (last updated Dec. 17, 2017) (“Smoking causes cancers of the lung, esophagus, larynx, 
mouth, throat, kidney, bladder, liver, pancreas, stomach, cervix, colon, and rectum, as well 
as acute myeloid leukemia.”); Celeste Katz, Tobacco Companies Admit Smoking Will Kill 
You, Thanks to Federally Mandated Ads, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/big-tobacco-companies-corrective-ads-justice-department-
smoking-722227; Tobacco Companies Lied About Smoking Dangers, D.C. Circuit Finds, 
24 NO. 20 ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUS. LITIG. REP. 2 (2009). 
45 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.: TOBACCO FACTS AND FIGURES, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm 
[https://betobaccofree.hhs.gov/about-tobacco/facts-figures/] (last visited Sept. 3, 2017) 
(“More than 20 million Americans have died because of smoking since 1964, including 
approximately 2.5 million deaths due to exposure to secondhand smoke.”). As Stanford 
professor Robert Proctor points out, “It’s still the leading cause of death. It still kills over 
400,000 Americans per year. It’s still two jumbo jets crashing every day.” Michael 
Mechanic, “Golden Holocaust” is the Book Big Tobacco Doesn’t Want You to Read, 
MOTHER JONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/05/tobacco-book-golden-
holocaust-robert-proctor (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). Worldwide, the number is even more 
grim; it is estimated 100 million people were killed by tobacco in the twentieth century, and 
that as many as 1 billion are expected to die from tobacco in this century. THE TOBACCO 
ATLAS: DEATHS, http://www.tobaccoatlas.org/topic/smokings-death-toll/ (last visited Feb. 
6, 2019). 
46 See generally Melancon v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 621 F. Supp. 567 
(W.D. Ky. 1985) (holding that the case, where a smoker brought action against a tobacco 
company for alleged injuries caused by cigarette tobacco sold without a warning label, was 
frivolous on its face); Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(finding for defendant because plaintiff did not offer proof that defendant could or should 
have known that smoking could cause cancer in an action brought against a cigarette 
manufacturer for larynx and lung cancer caused from smoking). 
47 See supra note 10.  
48 Henricksen, supra note 15. 
2019] Scientific Knowledge Fraud 321
industry defendants enjoy an unfair advantage in scientific knowledge 
fraud cases. The defendant need only raise doubt about the scientific 
idea, something relatively easy to do, while the plaintiff is tasked with 
proving the idea—for example, the link between smoking and cancer—
with certainty, something extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to 
do.49 Indeed, plaintiffs have routinely been denied compensation in 
suits against the tobacco,50 asbestos,51 and other industries because it 
is extraordinarily difficult to hold industry defendants liable.52 
To level the playing field, courts should apply the proposed falsity 
standard mentioned above in scientific knowledge fraud cases.53 This 
standard should apply, however, only to cases where falsity is at issue 
and where the alleged misrepresentation pertains to scientific 
knowledge. Accordingly, to determine whether to apply the standard in 
any particular case, courts must understand what scientific knowledge 
is and how particular representations should be construed as pertaining 
to, or not pertaining to, scientific knowledge. 
B. Scientific Knowledge
The fossil fuel industry misled the public about the link between CO2 
emissions and global warming.54 The asbestos industry misled the 
49 See infra notes 50–52. 
50 See Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, supra note 4; ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 4. 
51 See, e.g., BRODEUR, supra note 4; Brickman, supra note 4 (giving a brief overview of 
asbestos litigation); Gelinas, supra note 4 (discussing history of asbestos litigation); Bragg 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 734 A.2d 643 (D.C. 1999) (recounting the history of
asbestos use and litigation); Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.),
129 B.R. 710, 735 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recounting a detailed history of asbestos use),
vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985); Special Project, An Analysis
of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, Part I, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 573 (1983).
52 David G. Owen, Inherent Product Hazards, 93 KY. L.J. 377, 392–93 (2004); Alan L. 
Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 
SW. U. L. REV. 577, 672 (1998); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort 
Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 856 (1992); Richard Doll & A. Bradford Hill, A Study of 
the Aetiology of Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1952), http://www.ncbi.nlm. 
nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2022425/pdf/brmedj03472-0009.pdf; Ernest L. Wynder & Evarts 
A. Graham, Tobacco Smoking as a Possible Etiologic Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma:
A Study of Six Hundred and Eighty-Four Proved Cases, 143 JAMA 458 (1950). For more
information on the harms of smoking see Ray Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER’S DIG.,
Dec. 1952, at 7–8, https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=
nyyp0092, and its effect, see KLUGER, supra note 43, at 129–30.
53 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
54 Penn, supra note 3.  
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public about the health hazards of asbestos.55 The sugar industry misled 
the public about the health dangers of sugar.56 Again and again, the 
same scheme is repeated: a company sells a profitable but dangerous 
product. It hides the product’s dangers by lying about the science 
linking the product to the harm it causes. This scheme allows the 
company to continue selling the dangerous product. Profits are tied to 
how well companies in these industries can mislead the public about 
the science behind a product.  
What these companies and their allies misrepresented was, in each 
case, a fact drawn from a body of scientific knowledge.57 That is, 
whether CO2 emissions cause global warming is an epistemic question 
more than it is a fact question. And the only way to answer that, or any 
other question that arises from recent scientific inquiry, is to point to 
the scientific knowledge on the topic. To do that though, courts must 
first grasp what scientific knowledge is. 
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court defined “scientific 
knowledge” within the evidence context when it explained what 
constitutes admissible expert witness testimony:  
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes 
more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term 
“applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred 
from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.” Of course, it 
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific 
testimony must be “known” to a certainty; arguably, there are no 
certainties in science. But, in order to qualify as “scientific 
knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the 
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation—i.e., “good grounds,” based on what is 
known.58 
The Supreme Court made clear that there is a bright-line division 
between valid scientific knowledge, which is adequately supported and 
55 See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 328–29. 
56 See Camila Domonoske, 50 Years Ago, Sugar Industry Quietly Paid Scientists to Point 
Blame at Fat, NPR: TWO-WAY (Sept. 13, 2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
thetwo-way/2016/09/13/493739074/50-years-ago-sugar-industry-quietly-paid-scientists-
to-point-blame-at-fat.  
57 Henricksen, supra note 15, at 296 n.4 (“[T]o qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an 
assertion must be derived by scientific methods and supported by adequate validation.”) 
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); Scientific 
Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
58 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted). The Court noted that the determination 
entails an “assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony 
is scientifically valid.” Id. at 592–93. 
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derived from scientific methods, and invalid scientific knowledge, 
which is subjective belief and unsupported speculation.59 The Court 
laid out four factors for determining whether an assertion qualifies as 
scientific knowledge. Those factors are incorporated into the definition 
of “scientific knowledge” provided in Black’s Law Dictionary: 
(1) whether it has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to
peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error;
and (4) the degree of acceptance within the scientific community.60
No single factor is determinative. Moreover, courts have not applied 
these four factors in enough cases to give a complete picture of the 
parameters of what scientific knowledge comprises.61 Clearly, 
ExxonMobil purports to assert scientific knowledge through assertions 
like “scientists remain unable to confirm” if humans are causing global 
warming or “fundamental gaps in knowledge leave scientists unable to 
make reliable predictions about future changes.”62 They were 
assertions of fact about science, but did they square with the scientific 
knowledge they purported to assert? 
This question is further complicated by the fact that the scientific 
knowledge at issue is not a single scientist’s opinion, as is often the 
case when determining whether a particular expert’s opinion is based 
on scientific knowledge under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 
702.63 Rather, it is, epistemologically speaking, a matter of group 
knowledge.64 Accordingly, whether or not ExxonMobil’s above 
59 Id. at 589–90.  
60 Scientific Knowledge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
61 See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999) (granting 
defendant’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s expert causation witnesses after doing a full 
Daubert analysis without witnesses. Plaintiff was unable to establish causation and the court 
granted final summary judgment to defendants); Payne v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., No. 
2:08CV119, 2008 WL 5586824, at *1 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2008) (adding an additional factor 
to the Daubert factors to evaluate “whether the expert testimony was prepared solely for 
purposes of litigation, or whether it flowed naturally from the expert’s research or technical 
work”); Quintana v. Acosta, 316 P.3d 912 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that plaintiff’s 
expert witness testimony was admissible because it was based not on scientific knowledge 
but rather on the witness’s own knowledge, training, and experience, and was therefore not 
subject to the Daubert factors analysis). 
62 Unsettled Science, N.Y. TIMES, in Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Opinion, What 
Exxon Mobil Didn’t Say About Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017) [hereinafter 
ExxonMobil Advertorial], https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/exxon-climate-
change-.html. 
63 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579; FED. R. EVID. 702. 
64 See, e.g., Kristina Rolin, Science as Collective Knowledge, 9 COGNITIVE SYS. RES. 
115 (2008) [hereinafter Rolin, Collective Knowledge] (discussing scientific knowledge as 
group knowledge). 
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assertions are true hinges on whether they square with the knowledge 
of the scientific community, not whether they square with a single 
scientist’s knowledge.65 
The concept of group knowledge is based on “[t]he idea that groups 
can be treated as collective agents capable of knowledge and beliefs.”66 
Today, many epistemologists endorse the idea that collective 
knowledge is valid and obtainable; “groups can have knowledge.”67 
Naturally, however, “[g]roups that qualify as epistemic groups must at 
least be partly defined on the basis of epistemic properties related to 
knowledge possession, which allows them to behave like (individual) 
epistemic agents, and explains how it can achieve its knowledge.”68 
Scholars disagree about which groups of scientists can hold group 
knowledge,69 but widely agree that scientific knowledge can be group 
knowledge.70 As such, the debate hinges on how restrictive that 
designation should be (e.g., scientific research teams versus the entire 
scientific community).71 
But the question about which groups of scientists can have 
knowledge must be tailored to the context in which it is asked. It is one 
thing to ask it in the realm of philosophy or epistemology; it is quite 
another thing to ask it in a court of law. Within the very limited scope 
of this Article, which pertains to the falsity element in scientific 
knowledge fraud cases, it is most appropriate to adopt Dr. Kristina 
65 See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 298–99. 
66 A. Baltag, R. Boddy & S. Smets, Group Knowledge in Interrogative Epistemology, in 
JAAKKO HINTIKKA ON KNOWLEDGE AND GAME-THEORETICAL SEMANTICS 131, 131 (Hans 
van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu eds., 2018).  
67 Chris Dragos, Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray vs. Rolin, 30 SOC. 
EPISTEMOLOGY 611, 611 (2016); see also id. at n.1 (citing to thirty-four papers supporting 
the quoted assertion).  
68 Rachel Boddy, Epistemic Issues and Group Knowledge, (June 20, 2014) (unpublished 
M.Sc. thesis, University of Amsterdam), https://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Publications/
Reports/MoL-2014-03.text.pdf.
69 See, e.g., Dragos, supra note 67, at 611–12 (discussing the disagreement between Brad 
Wray and Kristina Rolin on how restrictive the kinds of groups to which collective 
knowledge can be attributed should be); Alexander Bird, When Is There a Group That 
Knows?, in ESSAYS IN COLLECTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 42, 44–47 (Jennifer Lackey ed., 2014) 
(addressing the question more broadly by asking “When is there a ‘group’, ‘collectivity’, or 
‘social system’ that knows?”). 
70 Compare Rolin, Collective Knowledge, supra note 64, and Kristina Rolin, Group 
Justification in Science, 7 EPISTEME 215 (2010) [hereinafter Rolin, Group Justification], 
with K. Brad Wray, Who Has Scientific Knowledge?, 21 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 337 (2007).  
71 See sources cited supra notes 69 and 70. 
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Rolin’s framework, set forth in a recent series of papers.72 Building on 
Professor Michael Williams’s analysis of epistemic responsibility,73 
Rolin articulated that “a scientific community as a whole can be 
epistemically responsible for some knowledge claims.”74 Under 
Rolin’s framework, the knowledge underlying the myriad of scientific 
principles behind sweeping assertions pertaining to, for instance, the 
causes of global warming, need not be entirely known by any 
individual scientist.75 Rather, group knowledge held by the scientific 
community will suffice. The scientific community could then designate 
specific scientists—who are most knowledgeable in a particular area—
to defend particular assertions or attacks.76 A designated scientist 
would be capable of defending something like global warming on 
behalf of the whole community, even though she or he would not 
necessarily possess knowledge of every underlying principle that 
global warming rests on.77 
In order to satisfy the falsity element, a plaintiff must prove that the 
representation was false or created an untrue or misleading 
impression.78 And given the sophisticated and complex nature of the 
science behind many of the misleading assertions made in recent 
history,79 the answer to questions on whether something like global 
72 See Kristina Rolin, Collective Epistemic Responsibility: A Reply to Chris Dragos, 5 
SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY REV. & REPLY COLLECTIVE 7 (2016) [hereinafter Rolin, Collective 
Epistemic Responsibility]; Rolin, Collective Knowledge, supra note 64; Wray, supra note 
70.  
73 See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO EPISTEMOLOGY 22 (2001) (“[W]e focus on whether a belief has been responsibly formed 
or is responsibly held. From this angle, justified belief is what we get by living up to 
appropriate standards of epistemic behaviour. For example, we can ask whether, in forming 
a certain belief, I have negligently ignored important counter-evidence. Call this ‘epistemic 
responsibility’ or ‘personal justification.’”); id. at 22–25 (elaborating on the concept of 
epistemic responsibility). 
74 Rolin, Collective Epistemic Responsibility, supra note 72. 
75 Id.; Rolin, Collective Knowledge, supra note 64, at 121. 
76 Rolin, Collective Epistemic Responsibility, supra note 72, at 7–8; Rolin, Collective 
Knowledge, supra note 64, at 121–22. 
77 See Rolin, Collective Epistemic Responsibility, supra note 72, at 8. 
78 United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 349 (1901); T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., 
Inc., 782 F. Supp. 1476, 1488 (D. Colo. 1991); Turner v. Milliman, 708 S.E.2d 766, 770 
(S.C. 2011); Prestwood v. City of Andalusia, 709 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Ala. 1997); Adams v. 
Gillig, 92 N.E. 670, 671 (N.Y. 1910); Hennig v. Ahearn, 601 N.W.2d 14, 25 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999); 37 Fraud and Deceit § 106, supra note 37. 
79 See, e.g., Joanna K. Sax, The Tobacco Diaries: Lessons Learned and Applied to 
Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 73 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 20, 28–31 (2013) (outlining 
the history of attempts by the tobacco industry to escape regulation); Complaint, People v. 
Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CGC-13-534108 (Super. Ct. Orange Cty. May 21, 2014) (lawsuit 
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warming is true or false comes from the community, rather than any 
individual.80  
Accordingly, a scientific knowledge fraud case arises when a 
defendant allegedly misrepresents knowledge held by the scientific 
community. The misrepresentation could be by statement or omission, 
and it must pertain to knowledge—or the state of the knowledge—held 
by the scientific community. 
C. The Parameters of Scientific Knowledge Fraud
Industry denial of the link between smoking and cancer, or CO2 
emissions and global warming, would be textbook scientific 
knowledge fraud cases. A court addressing such a claim should apply 
the proposed fraud-falsity standard: if a fraud defendant’s alleged 
statement or omission contradicted a clear body of scientific 
knowledge—in other words, is objectively untrue—then the falsity 
element would be satisfied. Similar to the link between smoking and 
cancer, or CO2 emissions and global warming, other cases where the 
falsity element is clearly satisfied, based on the underlying facts and 
not on the actual causes of action pleaded, include 
A. an action by the United States alleging that cigarette
manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations violated
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by
conspiring “to deceive the American public about the health
effects of smoking and environmental tobacco smoke,
addictiveness of nicotine, [and] the health benefits from low tar,
‘light’ cigarettes;”81
alleging opioid manufacturers knew that opioids were addictive); Brickman, supra note 4, 
at 54–59 (giving a brief overview of asbestos litigation); Penn, supra note 3 (discussing how 
ExxonMobil and its predecessor, Exxon, knew that the fossil fuel industry was causing 
climate change, yet denied this information to the public).  
80 Rolin, Collective Epistemic Responsibility, supra note 72. 
81 United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d 
in part vacated in part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). After a trial, the court ruled that the 
defendant tobacco companies deliberately deceived the American public about the health 
effects of smoking. Id. at 146 (“Cigarette smoking causes disease, suffering, and death. 
Despite internal recognition of this fact, Defendants have publicly denied, distorted, and 
minimized the hazards of smoking for decades.”); id. at 208 (“From at least 1953 until at 
least 2000, each and every one of these Defendants repeatedly, consistently, vigorously—
and falsely—denied the existence of any adverse health effects from smoking.”); id. at 856 
(“Defendants fraudulently denied the adverse health effects of smoking for at least 40 years 
in order to sustain the appearance of an open controversy about the link between smoking 
and disease, and thereby maintain and enhance the cigarette market and their collective 
revenues.”). 
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B. an action alleging that a pharmaceutical company made “a bad
faith misrepresentation of scientific data” by misrepresenting a
long-term clinical study of a drug it manufactures, making it
appear that the drug would cause fewer gastrointestinal side-
effects than the less costly competitors’ drug alternatives;82
C. an action alleging that a tobacco manufacturer, supplier, and
distributor violated Ohio’s consumer protection statutes by
manipulating nicotine levels, distorting medical and scientific
research, and falsely representing that nicotine is not
addictive;83
D. an action alleging pharmaceutical manufacturers actively
suppressed knowledge that opioids posed a risk of addiction
when used long-term while continuing to promote wider use of
the drugs and without disclosing the serious known risks;84 and
E. an action alleging that opioid makers and distributors spent
millions of dollars on marketing campaigns that “trivialize the
risks of opioids while overstating the benefits of using them for
chronic pain.”85
In each of these cases, the facts alleged include a purported 
misrepresentation of scientific knowledge. These are easy “yes” cases. 
On the flip side of this coin are easy “no” cases, such as an action 
alleging election fraud arising out of alleged absentee vote buying,86 a 
securities fraud claim centered on the terms of a stock option 
agreement,87 or a fraud claim arising out of the purchase of allegedly 
counterfeit espresso machines.88  
Other cases, however, cannot be so easily categorized as involving 
(or not involving) an alleged misrepresentation of scientific 
knowledge. For instance, a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud action against 
82 Al. Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2009).  
83 Chamberlain v. Am. Tobacco Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 788, 800–01 (N.D. Ohio 1999). 
84 Complaint, supra note 79, at 1–2. The complaint further alleged, “There was and is 
no reliable scientific evidence supporting Defendants’ marketing claims at issue, and there 
is a wealth of scientific evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 2. 
85 Complaint at 2, Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., (Ross Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017), 
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/Consumer-
Protection/2017-05-31-Final-Complaint-with-Sig-Page.aspx. 
86 Bolden v. Potter, 452 So. 2d 564, 565–66 (Fla. 1984). 
87 First Hanover Sec., Inc. v. Sulcus Comput. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 700, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). 
88 Jacobs Trading, LLC v. Ningbo Hicon Int’l Indus. Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 838, 838 (D. 
Minn. 2012). 
328 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 307 
ExxonMobil,89 where shareholders allege the company overstated the 
number of oil reserves it had because the company failed to subtract 
the reserves that did not count due to the additional warming that 
burning the oil would cause.90 Although the alleged fraud centered on 
ExxonMobil’s failure to account for global warming,91 ExxonMobil’s 
statements pertained to the number of oil reserves reported in its 
financial statements92 and, as such, only implicated the science of 
anthropogenic global warming indirectly. A court will determine 
whether a case like this involves an alleged misrepresentation of 
scientific knowledge as a matter of law.93 
A case brought against a university, its cancer research center, and 
its researchers, alleging its research relied on inaccurate scientific 
studies when applying for federal research funding, although 
constituting false claims in violation of the False Claims Act, also 
cannot be easily categorized as a scientific knowledge fraud case.94 
Although the funding application misrepresents scientific studies and 
data, it is not the kind of claim the proposed standard was created to 
address—namely, cases where a defendant misrepresents scientific 
knowledge to the public, the government, or policymakers to gain or 
retain the ability to sell a product that harms the public or the 
environment, such as tobacco, asbestos, sugar, or fossil fuels.95 This 
case, by contrast, involves the misrepresentation of specific studies or 
data to a narrow audience unrelated to selling goods of any kind.96  
If a case involves an alleged misrepresentation of scientific 
knowledge, the standard should apply. If not, it should not. 
89 Complaint, Ramirez, supra note 27; see also SEC Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
90 Complaint, Ramirez, supra note 27, at 2–3, 9–10.  
91 See id. at 13–14. 
92 Id. at 9–10.  
93 It is likely a question of law on one or more of the following grounds: as a preliminary 
question of fact, see, e.g., Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 181–83 (Mich. 2004); 
Harris v. Toys “R” Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); as an 
interpretation of the pleadings, see, e.g., Parsons v. United Techs. Corp., Sikorsky Aircraft 
Div., 700 A.2d 655, 664 (Conn. 1997); Carnegie v. Carnegie, 55 S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ga. 1949); 
Wells v. Clayton, 72 S.E.2d 16, 18 (N.C. 1952); or as a determination of whether a duty 
exists, see, e.g., Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 717 N.W.2d 17, 26–27 (Wis. 2006). 
See generally 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 599 (2018). 
94 United States ex rel. Milam v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 912 F. Supp. 868 (D. Md. 
1995). 
95 See generally supra INTRODUCTION. 
96 See United States ex rel. Milam, 912 F. Supp. at 873 (noting the claim centered on 
allegations that the defendants “submitted false data and false claims for payment in 
connection with grant applications to the United States between 1982 and the time the suit 
was filed”). 
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II 
DETERMINING THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY’S KNOWLEDGE AS THE 
BASELINE TRUTH 
If someone told you it is raining outside, the measure of whether that 
statement is true or false would be whether it squares with objective 
reality: Is it, in fact, raining? If it is, the statement was true. If it is not, 
it was false. This is the basis of the fraud-falsity element; to satisfy it, 
the defendant’s representation must be objectively untrue.97 
To find out if it is raining, you can simply step outside (or glance out 
a window) to look and see. But what if you were inside a soundproof 
building with no windows, and what if you had no way to get outside 
to check? In that case, you would have no way to learn firsthand if it is 
raining. Instead, you would need to rely on others. You could ask 
someone who recently arrived if it was raining when he or she entered 
the building. You could, assuming you had access to the internet, go 
online and check the weather on one or more websites. But what if you 
received conflicting reports? What if one source said yes, another said 
no, and yet another said it depends on what your definition of “raining” 
is? 
Suppose the weather outside is wet, but not necessarily raining. It 
may be drizzling, or it may just be foggy; like the weather in the Pacific 
Northwest during much of the winter, it may arguably be either one. 
Now imagine there are financially motivated companies putting out 
inaccurate weather information targeted at misleading people into 
believing it is raining when it is not, or that it is not raining when it is. 
Under these circumstances, a simple and straightforward question like 
Is it raining? becomes difficult, if not impossible, to answer. 
97 Spreitzer v. Hawkeye State Bank, 779 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa 2009); Mukhopadhyay v. 
Genesis Corp., 894 N.Y.S.2d 430 (App. Div. 2010); Parker v. Byrne, 996 A.2d 627 (R.I. 
2010); see also United States ex rel. Bahnsen v. Bos. Sci. Neuromodulation Corp., No. 11-
CV-1210, 2017 WL 6403864, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2017) (“The Third Circuit has found
that in the context of a FCA [False Claims Act] case, ‘[a] statement is “false” when it is
objectively untrue.’” (quoting United States ex rel. Thomas v. Siemens AG, 593 Fed. App’x
139, 143 (3rd Cir. 2014))); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW.
INST. 1981) (“A misrepresentation is an assertion that is not in accord with the facts.”). A
representation can also fulfill the falsity element if it creates an untrue or misleading
impression in the mind of the listener. T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enters., Inc., 782 F. Supp.
1476, 1488 (D. Colo. 1991); Wilson v. Neighborhood Restore Hous., 12 N.Y.S.3d 166, 168
(App. Div. 2015) (holding that, in a fraud action, a plaintiff must plead and prove “the
defendant made a representation concerning a material fact which was false and known by
the defendant to be false at the time it was made”); Coffield v. Cox, 162 S.W.2d 741, 743
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (“[T]o constitute actionable fraud the representations relied on must
be material and must be false at the time they were made.”).
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The problem is that without a baseline truth (it is raining or it is not 
raining) to compare with the company’s representation (it is raining), 
there is no accurate way to determine whether the representation is true 
or false. And courts addressing the falsity element of a scientific 
knowledge fraud claim face a worse dilemma than this. Not only must 
a court grapple with competing sources of purported scientific 
knowledge, which often contradict one another, but it must do so with 
regard to questions far more complex and difficult than a question like 
Is it raining? 
Determining the baseline truth in these cases requires wading into 
the muddy waters of scientific knowledge. Take, for instance, 
ExxonMobil’s March 23, 2000, New York Times advertorial entitled 
“Unsettled Science.”98 In it, ExxonMobil asserted that “scientists 
remain unable to confirm” that humans are causing global warming and 
that “fundamental gaps in knowledge leave scientists unable to make 
reliable predictions” about the climate.99 These statements cause 
countless problems for any court tasked with determining the 
truthfulness or falsity of a statement. However, before examining these 
statements to verify or debunk them, a court must first identify the 
precise subject matter the company was speaking about, and second, 
come up with a baseline truth corresponding to the subject matter 
addressed. Each task presents unique challenges to the court. 
A. First, Identify the Subject Matter of the Representation
If a company misrepresents its net income in a given year, or a for-
profit institution misrepresents the likelihood that its students find a job 
after graduating, determining the baseline truth is easy. A court must 
simply ask, What was that company’s net income that year? Or, it can 
ask, What were the true employment statistics for graduates of that for-
profit school? 
In a scientific knowledge fraud case, this question is typically far 
less straightforward. For example, consider ExxonMobil’s advertorial 
statements stated above: “scientists remain unable to confirm” that 
humans are causing global warming, and “fundamental gaps in 
knowledge leave scientists unable to make reliable predictions” about 
the climate.100 Both assertions pertain not to the underlying scientific 
fact (whether or not global warming is happening) but to scientists’ 
98 ExxonMobil Advertorial, supra note 62. 
99 See id.  
100 Id. 
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knowledge of it.101 This is an important distinction in regard to the 
fraud-falsity element: it dictates what baseline truth must be uncovered 
and how the truth compares with the company’s statement to determine 
whether the statement is true or false. The baseline truth that 
corresponds to ExxonMobil’s advertorial statement is determined by 
what scientists knew at the time the statement was made—not by 
whether global warming was happening, per se.102 ExxonMobil’s 
representations pertained to (1) scientists’ knowledge of whether 
humans are causing global warming and (2) scientists’ ability to make 
reliable predictions about the climate. Having identified the 
representation’s subject matter, the court’s next step is to determine the 
baseline truth. 
B. Second, Come Up with a Baseline Truth Statement to Compare
with the Defendant’s Representation to Determine the 
Representation’s Truthfulness or Falsity 
As numerous authors have noted, courts are ill-equipped to 
determine scientific truth.103 Nevertheless, courts must. Subsection 
II.B.1 discusses how courts can come up with an accurate baseline truth
statement to apply in scientific knowledge fraud claims. Alternatively,
courts could implement a new guideline standard to help make this
determination. Subsection II.B.2 discusses this guideline standard and
how it could be crafted by combining components of the Frye standard,
the Daubert standard, and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. A final option
would be for scientific experts, as opposed to judges, to decide
scientific issues of law and assist the jury in deciding issues of fact.
This option is discussed in Subsection II.B.3.
1. Baseline Truth Under Current Law
Courts tasked with determining the baseline truth pertaining to a
defendant’s representation of scientific knowledge have a difficult 
101 This is consistent with the message put out by a great number of other climate-change 
deniers, some of them funded by ExxonMobil, which made similar remarks throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 312–13 n.99–100 (2017). 
102 Scientifically, this distinction may be irrelevant or nonexistent since the only “facts” 
that exist about global warming and its effects exist in the knowledge of the scientific 
community. See generally LISA V. ALEXANDER ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY 
FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (2013), http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5 
_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
103 See, e.g., Parker-Flynn, supra note 22, at 11118. 
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job.104 Most judges are not scientists.105 Neither are most jurors. 
Nevertheless, judges and jurors must decide scientific issues when 
addressing scientific knowledge fraud claims. Judges, for instance, 
must decide whether evidence that may discern the baseline truth is 
admissible under Daubert and its progeny,106 Federal Rule of Evidence 
702,107 or Frye and its progeny.108 Once the court determines which 
evidence is admissible regarding what the scientific community knew 
at the time of the defendant’s representation,109 the trier of fact decides 
what that baseline truth was.110  
In addition to determining the baseline truth, the court should make 
a baseline truth statement (BTS). A BTS allows the trier of fact to more 
clearly understand the scientific knowledge, or state of the scientific 
knowledge, at the time of the defendant’s representation.111 A BTS 
104 See supra notes 8, 9, and 11 and accompanying text. 
105 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (No. 05-1120) (Justice Scalia noting that because he is not a scientist he does not 
want to deal with scientific issues). 
106 See Nease v. Ford Motor Co. 848 F.3d 219, 228–29 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing 
Daubert and its progeny); To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings 
Appropriate?, SF78 ALI-ABA 371 (2001). 
107 See FED. R. EVID. 702; To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings 
Appropriate?, SF78 ALI-ABA 371 (2001). 
108 Under the Frye standard, “The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of 
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the general acceptance of the underlying 
scientific principles and methodology.” Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 
2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 2003); see also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 
1923). 
109 See, e.g., Wilson v. Neighborhood Restore Hous., 12 N.Y.S.3d 166, 168 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2015) (holding that, in a fraud action, a plaintiff must plead and prove “the defendant 
made a representation concerning a material fact which was false and known by the 
defendant to be false at the time it was made”); Coffield v. Cox, 162 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1942) (“[T]o constitute actionable fraud the representations relied on must be 
material and must be false at the time they were made.”). 
110 See, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Bigelow v. Timmerman, 7 Wend. 436, 438 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 
1831) (fraud elements are ruled on as questions of fact for the jury). 
111 Written words can have different meanings to different people, as evidenced, for 
instance, by the wildly divergent interpretations of the Second Amendment. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). Compare District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008) (holding that an individual has a right to own 
a firearm for reasons “unconnected to militia service,” such as for self-defense within the 
home), with Interview with Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Warren Burger on 
the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour by Charlayne Hunter-Gault at 7:49 (PBS television 
broadcast Dec. 16, 1991), https://vimeo.com/157433062 (“If I were writing the Bill of 
Rights now there wouldn’t be any such thing as the Second Amendment. . . . This has been 
the subject of one of the greatest pieces of fraud, I repeat the word fraud, on the American 
public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in my lifetime.”). But when words are 
written down, most people can at least agree what the words are. On the other hand, as 
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allows the juror to read, reread, and ponder the scientific knowledge. 
Although still open to differing interpretations, putting a BTS in writing 
removes at least the confusion of jurors coming up with differently 
worded baseline truths.112 It also gives the juror a more tangible 
statement to compare with the defendant’s representation. While a BTS 
may have a very high utility, writing a BTS presents enormous 
challenges. Namely, a court must carefully craft a BTS because it 
requires the trier of fact to adopt exact language to encapsulate ideas 
and concepts not easily reduced to short or easily digested words or 
phrases.113 
Nevertheless, courts are not helpless in this endeavor. Consider 
again ExxonMobil’s advertorial where it stated that “scientists remain 
unable to confirm” that humans are causing global warming.114 
Assuming a plaintiff in a fraud case alleged that statement was a 
misrepresentation, the court must ask: Were scientists able to confirm 
if humans were causing global warming on March 23, 2000?  
A court could adopt the BTS from an existing document.115 
Alternatively, it could create a BTS based on the evidence presented to 
it, most likely through expert witness testimony and documents such as 
scientific papers, studies, and data.116 Returning to the ExxonMobil 
advertorial hypothetical, a court might adopt the following BTS: 
anyone who has ever played the childhood game telephone would attest, when the words 
are merely spoken the probability of misunderstanding what those words mean, or even what 
those words are, multiplies. See, e.g., Ingrid Wickelgren, Speaking Science: Why People 
Don’t Hear What You Say, SCI. AM. (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/bring-science-home-speaking-memory. 
112 See Wickelgren, supra note 111. 
113 To give one example, the IPCC publishes its Assessment Report every six to eight 
years. These reports consist of many hundreds of pages of dense information. Within those 
pages, dozens or hundreds of pages pertain to individual questions such as, “Is global 
warming happening?” or “Are humans causing global warming?” See ALEXANDER ET AL., 
supra note 102; THOMAS G. FARMER & JOHN COOK, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: A 
MODERN SYNTHESIS: VOLUME 1: THE PHYSICAL CLIMATE (2015). Thus, trying to come up 
with a concise BTS on those questions poses a legitimately difficult problem. 
114 ExxonMobil Advertorial, supra note 62.  
115 This would be, for instance, from a document accurately representing sentiments held 
by the scientific community at large in that area of science such as the IPCC Assessment 
Reports. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 102; FARMER & COOK, supra note 113. 
Or, the statement could come from a leading private or public organization that brings 
together scientists of a particular field, such as the Geological Society of America, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. Although climate science offers helpful summaries on how the global 
scientific community is addressing climate change, it is unclear how many other areas of 
science offer similar cheat sheets for courts. 
116 This is what the trier of fact does in every case. It comes up with what happened 
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CO2 is accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human 
activities, causing air and ocean temperatures to rise. Natural forces 
do not explain the warming. Increases in CO2 concentrations are 
virtually certain to be due to fossil fuel emissions. 
This language, which contains direct quotes and paraphrases from a 
report by the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on the 
Science of Climate Change and from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s Third Assessment from 2001,117 reflects climate 
scientists’ view on the topic at about the time of ExxonMobil’s 
statement. 
Whether a court adopts a BTS from an existing document or 
documents, or comes up with its own language, the exercise would 
entail a potentially burdensome and time-consuming use of judicial 
resources, often seen when courts are tasked with determining 
scientific truths.118 For that reason, courts should implement a 
guideline standard for creating or adopting a BTS, making the task 
easier and less draining on judicial resources. 
2. Baseline Truth Under a Truth-Determination Guideline
There appears to be no specific guidance in either scholarship or case
law regarding how courts should determine the BTS used to compare 
to a defendant’s allegedly false representation.119 However, there is 
ample guidance regarding which scientific expert testimony should be 
based on the evidence and arguments of the two (or more) parties to the case. See Jurick v. 
British Airways, No. 86 C 2674, 1987 WL 12035, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 1987) (noting 
that the trier of fact “determines what happened” in the case before it).  
117 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY 
QUESTIONS 1 (2001) (“Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result 
of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to 
rise.”); K.S. WHITE ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY: TECHNICAL SUMMARY 19, 
21 (2001) (“Human activities . . . are modifying the concentration of atmospheric 
constituents . . . that absorb or scatter radiant energy. . . . [M]ost of the observed warming 
over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse gas 
concentrations.”); DANIEL L. ALBRITTON ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS: SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 1, 7 (2001), http://webpages.icav.up.pt/PTDC/CVT/098487/2008/IPPC, 
%202001.pdf (“Concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing 
have continued to increase as a result of human activities.”). 
118 This can be seen, for instance, in the difficulty, time, and expense involved in 
Daubert evidentiary hearings. See To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings 
Appropriate?, SF78 ALI-ABA 371 (2001). 
119 A search of cases and scholarship revealed no on-point authorities. 
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admitted and which should be excluded.120 Evidence submitted to the 
trier of fact will already have passed through the scientific “gate” in an 
FRE 702 or Daubert jurisdiction121 or passed through the Frye 
generally accepted test in a jurisdiction that applies that standard.122 
The scientific evidence that crosses these hurdles, however, is not all 
equally valid or necessarily scientifically valid at all. Accordingly, not 
all evidence should be given equal weight.123 As a result, the guidelines 
given to the trier of fact for determining the BTS must necessarily be 
narrower than either of these evidentiary standards. The guidelines 
must further filter out bad or misleading scientific assertions. 
First, the trier of fact must ensure that the baseline truth reflects the 
entire scientific community’s opinion rather than a minority, or even 
majority, one.124 There is only one baseline truth. Turning again to 
ExxonMobil’s statement that “scientists remain unable to confirm” if 
humans are causing global warming, the baseline truth concerns the 
knowledge of the whole scientific community. Accordingly, 
disagreements can and should be built into the BTS. Disagreement 
among scientists is as much a part of scientific knowledge as is a degree 
of uncertainty.125 Whether the statement says “majority of scientists,” 
“vast majority of scientists,” or “ninety-seven percent of scientists,” for 
120 For a discussion regarding the Daubert standard and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
see Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 228–29 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing Daubert 
and its progeny); To Hear or Not to Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings Appropriate?, SF78 
ALI-ABA 371 (2001). For a discussion of the Frye standard, see Frye v. United States, 293 
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d
1264, 1268 (Fla. 2003).
121 See Nease, 848 F.3d at 228 (discussing Daubert and its progeny); To Hear or Not to 
Hear: When Are Daubert Hearings Appropriate?, SF78 ALI-ABA 371 (2001); FED. R. EVID. 
702. 
122 See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1268; Frye, 293 F. at 1013. 
123 See People v. Brown, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (Ct. App. 2001) (where the prosecution 
shows that the correct procedures were followed in the generation of evidence by a new 
scientific technique, criticisms of the techniques go to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 559 (6th Cir. 1993) (“‘[F]laws in 
methodology’ uncovered by peer review do not necessarily equate to a lack of scientific 
validity, since the methods may be based on scientific principles and the alleged flaws go 
merely to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence and the testimony.”). 
124 This is because the proposed standard clarifies that for a representation of scientific 
knowledge to be false, it must “misrepresent[] knowledge held by the scientific community 
at the time such statement or omission was made.” Supra INTRODUCTION; Henricksen, 
supra note 15, at 342.  
125 See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an 
Adversarial Context: Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 123, 124 (2008) (“All science builds on disagreements.”). 
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instance, is a matter of discretion left to the trier of fact.126 It, like all 
components of the BTS, must be objectively true. 
Because the BTS must, in most cases, reflect the scientific 
community as a whole, the Frye standard of “general acceptance” of a 
scientific idea can be a helpful guide.127 However, the Frye standard’s 
particular focus is on propositions that either are or are not generally 
accepted as a threshold inquiry regarding admissibility of evidence.128 
When creating the BTS, however, the trier of fact’s inquiry is not 
whether any particular theory is generally accepted but rather what was 
generally accepted at the time of the representation, regardless of 
whether there was any particular consensus or how the percentage of 
acceptance of competing viewpoints may have looked at the time.129  
Second, the trier of fact must be precise. For instance, there are 
material differences between scientists believing a phenomenon is 
somewhat likely, likely, very likely, or virtually certain to occur. These 
words may have different meanings depending on what phenomenon 
they describe.130 Like lawyers, scientists carefully craft the language 
used in studies and reports to convey exactly what knowledge the 
phenomenon represents.131 The terms used in the BTS should reflect 
exactly, or otherwise accurately, the words used in the source materials 
or evidence from which the statement is adopted or crafted.132  
Third, to avoid tainting the BTS, the trier of fact should craft the 
BTS without referring to the defendant’s representation of the truth. 
Exposure to the defendant’s representation while crafting the BTS 
would likely create a tendency, or at least a temptation, to tailor the 
126 See, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Bigelow v. Timmerman, 7 Wend. 436, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1831) (fraud elements are ruled on as questions of fact for the jury). 
127 Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1268; see also Frye, 293 F. at 1014. 
128 Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1268. 
129 See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 342. 
130 See ALBRITTON ET AL., supra note 117, at 2 n.7 (“[T]he following words have been 
used where appropriate to indicate judgmental estimates of confidence: virtually certain 
(greater than 99% chance that a result is true); very likely (90−99% chance); likely (66−90% 
chance) . . . .”). 
131 See, e.g., Cathleen O’Grady, Climate Scientists Write Tentatively; Their Opponents 
Are Certain They’re Wrong, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 9, 2015, 9:50 AM), https://arstechnica. 
com/science/2015/10/climate-scientists-are-tentative-their-opponents-are-certain-theyre-
wrong/ (noting how careful and cautious climate scientists are with their words, particularly 
when compared with climate science denialists). 
132 One way to accomplish this would be to apply a uniform scale of scientific certainty 
to baseline truth statements, so that any BTS would express a clear level of scientific 
certainty. See Charles Weiss, Expressing Scientific Uncertainty, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 25 (2003). Weiss articulated an eleven-level scale to facilitate expressions of opinion 
regarding the certainty or uncertainty of a given scientific assertion. Id. at 30–31. 
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BTS to conform to or otherwise reflect the defendant’s 
representation.133 
3. Baseline Truth Determined by an Expert Tribunal
In his article Expertise on Trial, James R. Dillon proposed having
scientific experts decide scientific issues of law and fact.134 Other 
authors, including Judge Learned Hand, have made similar 
proposals.135 Studies reveal that judges generally cannot apply the 
Daubert test with a level of competence necessary to satisfy intellectual 
due process.136 In fact—on numerous occasions dating back more than 
a hundred years—judges have recognized their own inability to 
adequately grasp and decide scientific issues.137 Dillon suggests a 
133 There are a number of biases that support this proposition, including confirmation 
bias and illusory truth effect. See, e.g., Bill Kanasky, Jr., Juror Confirmation Bias: Powerful, 
Perilous, Preventable, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2014, at 35 (confirmation bias) (“There is 
a tendency for jurors to search for, interpret, or remember information in a way that 
‘confirms’ their preconceptions, biases or beliefs.”); Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level 
Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 
161 (2010) (illusory truth effect) (discussing a study where “a group of experimental 
psychologists discovered that, simply by repeating a plausible proposition two or three 
times, they could impart to their hearers significantly increased confidence in the truth of 
that proposition, regardless of its actual truth or falsity”). 
134 Dillon, supra note 22. 
135 See, e.g., Hand, supra note 22 (proposing “a board of experts or a single expert, not 
called by either side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the 
case which lie within his province” of scientific or expert knowledge); Hor, supra note 22 
(proposing “an expert tribunal to decide between competing expert generalisations” put 
forth by the parties). 
136 Dillon, supra note 22, at 272. 
137 See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912); Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 
A.3d 1065, 1093 (Pa. 2017) (the trial judge stated, “That’s my understanding. I’m not a
scientist. I could be wrong about that.”); Petition for Certiorari, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings
v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (No. 04-607), 2005 WL 3939545, at *62–63
(the petition contained a transcript of U.S. District Court proceedings in which the district
judge stated, “I could be wrong; I’m not a scientist, certainly.”). The oral argument from
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 105, provides an additional illustration that jurists are not scientists and might be
uncomfortable addressing difficult scientific issues. In that case, the United States Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether carbon dioxide was a pollutant that could be regulated
under the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). During oral
argument, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia had the following colloquy with counsel for the
State of Massachusetts:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Milkey . . . . I always thought an air pollutant was 
something different from a stratospheric pollutant, and your claim here is not that 
the pollution of what we normally call “air” is endangering health. That isn’t, that 
isn’t—your assertion is that after the pollutant leaves the air and goes up into the 
stratosphere it is contributing to global warming. 
338 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 307 
solution to this problem by proposing a “social epistemological 
solution” (SES) where “scientific adjuncts,” not judges, make 
conclusions of law and fact on issues involving expert witness 
testimony.138 Dillon acknowledges that the SES “could be 
implemented in countless ways.”139 But—“[f]or reasons of political 
viability as well as to preserve the values embedded in the [existing] 
institutional structure” of American courts—he proposes implementing 
the SES in a manner that both maintains as much of the existing 
structure as possible and establishes an epistemologically valid solution 
to the epistemic competence problem.140  
Using scientific experts to decide scientific issues is not a new idea. 
In 1911, Judge Learned Hand lamented, “How long we shall continue 
to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative 
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but 
all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind 
ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.”141 In that 
same opinion, Judge Hand noted that courts in at least one other 
country, Germany, summon “technical judges to whom technical 
questions are submitted and who can intelligently pass upon the issues 
without blindly groping among testimony upon matters wholly out of 
their ken[,]” while U.S. courts still task generalist judges with scientific 
and technical questions.142 Additionally, commentators have noted the 
urgent need to integrate science into the law143—not only because 
MR. MILKEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, it is not the stratosphere. It is the 
troposphere. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Troposphere, whatever. I told you before I’m not a scientist. 
(Laughter) 
JUSTICE SCALIA: That’s why I don’t want to have to deal with global warming, 
to tell you the truth. 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 105 (emphasis added). 
138 Dillon, supra note 22. 
139 Id. at 295. 
140 Id. at 295–96. 
141 Parke-Davis & Co., 189 F. at 115. 
142 Id.  
143 See, e.g., Pauline Newman, Law and Science: The Testing of Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 419, 427 (2000) (“[W]e must recognize and accommodate the needs of 
science in the rule of law. The complexity of the interaction between law and science 
remains to be understood. As we enter this intellectual endeavor with greater urgency, the 
judge and the scientist must take strong steps to understand each other, the better to serve 
each other.”); Breyer, supra note 33 (“[T]he law itself increasingly needs access to sound 
science. . . . [A]s society becomes more dependent for its wellbeing upon scientifically 
complex technology, we find that this technology increasingly underlies legal issues of 
importance to all of us.”). 
2019] Scientific Knowledge Fraud 339
science is increasingly important to our health, wealth, and security,144 
but also because it is under attack.145 
By implementing the SES,146 scientific experts—rather than 
judges—could make a more accurate and just determination of the 
BTS. Additionally, courts would handle other components of the fraud-
falsity analysis more accurately and efficiently. Unlike judges, 
144 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 33 (noting that World War II was “the starting point of 
America’s realization that continued dominance in the international scene depends upon 
scientific and technological supremacy”); Obama, supra note 33 (“Science is more essential 
for our prosperity, our security, our health, our environment, and our quality of life than it 
has ever been before.”). 
145 The reports of how the new administration attacks science are widespread and 
troubling. See, e.g., Matthew C. Nisbet, Ending the Crisis of Complacency in Science, AM. 
SCI., Jan.–Feb. 2017, at 18, https://www.americanscientist.org/article/ending-the-crisis-of-
complacency-in-science (“As newly elected president Donald Trump takes office, the 
scientific community faces the likelihood not only of unprecedented cuts in government 
funding for research, but also of bold new attacks on scientific expertise as a basis for policy 
making and decisions. Trump campaigned on a pledge to eliminate as much as $100 million 
in ‘wasteful climate change spending,’ and there have been reports of plans to severely cut 
funding for NASA and other agencies.”); Television Interview with Bill McKibben, Real 
Time with Bill Maher, Episode 417 (HBO television broadcast Mar. 3, 2017) (“The level of 
just complete corruption from the fossil fuel industry that marks this administration is like 
nothing we’ve ever seen.”). The Department of Interior recently demanded that language 
connecting sea level rise and coastal flooding to climate change be removed from a press 
release announcing a new publication by scientists working for the United States Geological 
Survey. See Department of Interior Censors Press Release on USGS Study, UNION 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/center-science-and-democracy/attacks-
on-science/department-interior-censors-press-release-usgs-study#.WW-9MOmQzIU (last 
updated May 25, 2017). At the Department of Energy, Trump Administration officials are 
systematically editing departmental websites to strip references to climate change, downplay 
impacts of fossil fuels, and scale back benefits of clean energy. Climate Change Language 
Altered on DOE Webpages, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
center-science-and-democracy/attacks-on-science/climate-change-language-altered-doe-
webpages#.WW-96emQzIU (last updated May 25, 2017). In March 2017, EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt falsely claimed that carbon dioxide is not a primary contributor 
to global warming. EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt Lies About the Causes of Climate 
Change, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/center-science-and-
democracy/attacks-on-science/epa-administrator-scott-pruitt-lies-about-causes#.WW-
_cOmQzIU (last updated March 10, 2017); see also WENDY WAGNER & RENA STEINZOR, 
CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE PUBL’N, RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND 
THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 4 (2006) (stating that “[e]ven large, apolitical 
societies such as the American Association of the Advancement of Science have passed 
resolutions and filed comments on the increasing problems of biased research and literature 
reviews that damage scientific credibility,” and noting “how far the legal system has strayed 
in its use of science, threatening scientific integrity at its core”). 
146 Dillon, supra note 22. Dillon’s proposal calls for lay jurors to remain the finder of 
fact in the first instance, subject to the scientific adjuncts’ authority to enter a scientific 
judgment as a matter of law, or JMOL, where the scientific evidence is insufficient to sustain 
the judgment. Id. at 303. That authority is intended to parallel judges’ existing authority to 
enter a JMOL. Id. at 303–04. 
340 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 307 
scientific experts could more accurately identify the scientific 
community’s knowledge on any given scientific topic, compare the 
BTS with the defendant’s representation, and determine whether the 
defendant’s representation was true or false. 
III 
A FRAMEWORK FOR COURTS APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD 
To determine falsity, a question of fact for the jury,147 the BTS 
should be put side by side with the defendant’s representation to see if 
they say the same thing. Or, in other words, to see whether each 
statement gives the reader the same impression.148 If it does, the 
defendant’s representation was true. If it does not, the representation 
was false. This should be done with each alleged misrepresentation of 
scientific knowledge; if there are twenty-seven allegedly false 
statements, each must be juxtaposed with its corresponding BTS to 
determine its truthfulness or falsity. Turning again to the ExxonMobil 
advertorial hypothetical, the two statements side by side would look 
like this: 
Baseline Truth Statement Defendant’s Statement 
CO2 is accumulating in Earth’s 
atmosphere as a result of human 
activities, causing air and ocean 
temperatures to rise. Natural forces 
do not explain the warming. 
Increases in CO2 concentrations are 
virtually certain to be due to fossil 
fuel emissions.149 
[IPCC 2001, NAS 2001] 
Scientists are unable to confirm 
whether humans are causing global 
warming.150 
[March 23, 2000] 
Given that the statement in the left-hand column is true, the court 
must ask whether the defendant’s statement in the right-hand column 
147 See, e.g., Martin v. Sixty-Third & Halsted State Sav. Bank, 19 N.E.2d 634, 636 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1939) (noting that in a fraud action the determination of the words used in 
defendant’s representation is a question of fact for the jury). 
148 Even if there was no false statement, if the overall impression of representations is 
misleading, it can fulfill the falsity element. See Downey v. Finucane, 98 N.E. 391, 393 
(N.Y. 1912); 37 Fraud and Deceit § 106, supra note 37; 60A Fraud and Deceit, supra note 
40. 
149 See sources cited supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
150 See ExxonMobil Advertorial, supra note 62. 
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is false. Materiality, knowledge, intent, and all fraud elements other 
than falsity should be ignored for the purpose of this analysis. The only 
question is whether the two statements say the same thing. On its face, 
this analysis appears straightforward. However, because courts are 
confronted with unique challenges when deciding scientific knowledge 
fraud cases,151 the trier of fact should take into account a number of 
other considerations. Those considerations should more precisely focus 
on the idiosyncratic difficulties of parsing statements pertaining to 
scientific knowledge. When comparing the two statements, the trier of 
fact should ask the eight questions discussed below.152 A “yes” answer 
to a single question should, at a minimum, raise red flags. Depending 
on the facts of the particular case, a single “yes” answer might tip the 
scale irretrievably in favor of finding that the defendant’s statement 
was false.  
Question One: At the time of the representation, does the defendant 
have an economic, political, ideological, or religious motive to make a 
statement inconsistent with the opinion of the scientific community? 
If the fact at issue is the link between CO2 emissions and climate 
change, a fossil fuel company, or any individual or entity closely 
affiliated with it, would benefit from raising doubt about the link 
between CO2 emissions and global warming. Because the defendant 
benefits as a result of raising doubt about global warming and, as a 
result, is likely biased, the court should consider this bias when 
addressing the remaining questions, as well as when answering the 
overall question of whether the representation was false. 
Notably, this question is particularly relevant, as it goes to the heart 
of the problem in scientific knowledge fraud cases: corporations are 
motivated to mislead the public about the science behind their products 
in order to make a profit. 
Question Two: Is the evidentiary support, if any, underlying the 
defendant’s representation biased? 
The answer to this question should be “yes” if any of the biases 
discussed in Question One above are present in the evidentiary support 
or if the defendant cited or relied on biased authority to make its 
representation. Scientific knowledge representations are often made 
without reference to any support at all. But if support is cited, the 
151 See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO POPPER, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
152 See Henricksen, supra note 15, at 349–53 (discussing five questions resembling those 
I propose here). Here, however, I have further developed, refined, revised, and expanded 
each question, as well as added three new questions to the list. 
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support should be assessed for bias and authority: Is the support or 
authority derived from objective sources or biased ones? Are the 
authorities underlying the BTS different from those underlying the 
defendant’s statement? How do the authorities relied on by the 
defendant differ from those relied on to create the BTS?  
As with Question One, if the court answers “yes” to this question, it 
should consider the biased information underlying the defendant’s 
representation when addressing the remaining questions.  
Question Three: Does the defendant’s representation misstate or 
misconstrue the scientific authority it purports to rely on? 
The answer to this question should be “yes” if the defendant cites 
scientific authority for its statement, but the statement itself is not fully 
supported by the underlying authority it relies on. Companies seeking 
to raise scientific doubt commonly misstate or misconstrue the 
underlying science as a tactic. To determine whether a company did so, 
the court must examine the underlying scientific authority. The court 
need not inquire whether the defendant quoted word-for-word what is 
stated in the underlying authority. Instead, the inquiry hinges on 
whether the defendant’s statement is consistent with, and is a 
reasonable representation of, the underlying authority. If the 
defendant’s statement leads the listener to believe something different 
from what is contained in the underlying authority, then its statement 
should be considered misleading, and this question should be answered 
“yes.”  
Question Four: Does the defendant’s statement contain any words 
or phrases that make its statement mean something different than the 
baseline truth statement? 
This question is aimed at whether the defendant’s wording in its 
statement conflicts with the wording in the BTS in a manner that 
describes the same thing but means something different. Such words 
with conflicting meanings could pertain to, for example, the likelihood 
of a phenomenon happening or the strength of evidence supporting a 
particular theory. For instance, if the BTS stated that CO2 emissions 
“likely” cause global warming, and the defendant’s statement said that 
CO2 emissions “possibly” cause global warming, then the terms are 
inconsistent. Such an inconsistency would merit a “yes” answer to this 
question. 
Again, the bar here is low because this inquiry is strictly limited to 
truthfulness or falsity, not knowledge, intent, or any other element. The 
two statements either do or do not say the same thing.  
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Question Five: Does the defendant’s statement, taken as a whole, 
present the fact at issue in a manner inconsistent with the baseline truth 
statement? 
Even if there are no explicitly inconsistent words or phrases between 
the two statements, the defendant’s statement might nevertheless give 
a different overall impression than the BTS. For instance, if the BTS 
asserted that “scientists are in virtually unanimous agreement that CO2 
emissions cause global warming,” while the defendant’s statement 
asserted that “a number of studies have shown a link between CO2 
emissions and global warming, while other studies have shown no link 
at all,” the answer to this question should be “yes.” Though the 
defendant’s statement does not explicitly contradict the BTS, it does so 
implicitly. The BTS gives the impression that CO2 emissions almost 
certainly cause global warming; the defendant’s statement gives the 
impression that the science is unsettled and CO2 emissions may or may 
not cause global warming. The defendant’s hypothetical statement may 
very well be factually correct—it is undoubtedly true that “a number of 
studies have shown a link between CO2 emissions and global warming, 
while other studies have shown no link at all”—yet, because this 
statement communicates a different level of certainty than the BTS, it 
should, under the proposed standard, be false for the purposes of a fraud 
claim.153  
Fraud law recognizes many technically true statements as false 
under the law.154 This nuance is particularly important in the realm of 
scientific knowledge fraud, where defendants routinely make 
statements that are (or arguably are) technically true but also mislead 
the public.155 The touchstone inquiry here is whether or not the 
defendant’s statement gives the reader an accurate understanding of the 
153 See generally Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wis. Nat. Bank of Sheboygan, 12 F. 
Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (referencing an earlier decision and order on a summary 
judgment motion, the court quoted itself as stating that “[a] representation can be technically 
accurate, yet still misleading” for purposes of negligent and intentional misrepresentation 
claims); KEETON ET AL., supra note 40 (“[M]isrepresentation may be found in statements 
which are literally true, but which create a false impression in the mind of the hearer . . . .”). 
154 See Grove Holding Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 890. 
155 For instance, suppose someone were to claim that “no scientist on earth could tell 
you with one hundred percent certainty that the earth is warming, let alone that we humans 
are causing it.” This statement is technically true, because climate science—indeed, all the 
sciences—does not work on certainties but on probabilities. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are 
no certainties in science.”). 
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scientific knowledge held by the scientific community (as stated in the 
BTS). 
Additionally, by turning the public’s attention to the wrong set of 
data, a company’s statement can also mislead the public. For instance, 
Exxon’s CEO once insisted that the science on climate change was 
uncertain and, as support for this idea, told his audience that “[w]e also 
have to keep in mind that most of the greenhouse effect comes from 
natural sources, especially water vapor.”156 This statement is both 
irrelevant (stating a fact unrelated to anthropogenic climate change) 
and misleading (giving the impression that climate change is naturally 
occurring to unsophisticated nonscientists). It is also a logical fallacy 
at least two times over: it qualifies as both a big lie and a red herring.157 
Yes, there is a large amount of natural greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere. Without them, Earth’s average surface temperature would 
be about negative fifteen degrees Celsius (or five degrees 
Fahrenheit).158 Exxon’s president made this statement, however, to 
give the impression the science on global warming was suspect, or even 
a sham; he was misinforming rather than informing. Even assuming the 
other assertions contained in the statement were factual—which they 
were not—the statement serves only to mislead. Such a statement could 
also be grounds for a “yes” answer to this question. 
Finally, the court should also be on the lookout for cautionary terms 
and phrases used frequently by those trying to raise scientific doubt. 
These terms include might, may, maybe, could, belief, believe, we 
believe, scientists believe, some believe, conjecture, opinion, 
judgment, view, viewpoint, possible, possibly, speculate, 
speculative, uncertain, unsettled, theory, theorize, theoretical, 
hypothesis, hypothesize, hypothetical, surmise, guess, suppose, 
suspect, although, while, albeit, even though, notwithstanding, 
sincere attempt to determine, unanswered questions, jump to the 
conclusion, variables, variability, difficult to determine, gaps in the 
data, missing data, more study needed, more proof needed, we will 
look into it, we are looking into it, we are investigating, studies are 
ongoing, this is a complex issue, we are trying to clear up 
misunderstandings, until it can be proved or disproved, until it is 
156 Lee R. Raymond, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Exxon Corp., Energy—Key to 
Growth and a Better Environment for Asia-Pacific Nations 9 (Oct. 13, 1997), 
http://www.climatefiles.com/exxonmobil/1997-exxon-lee-raymond-speech-at-world-
petroleum-congress/. 
157 See id. 
158 See Carbon in the Atmosphere, EARTHLABS, http://serc.carleton.edu/eslabs/carbon/ 
3a.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2019). 
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determined conclusively, remains an open question, our goal is the 
truth, and other similar or related terms or phrases.159  
By using these terms and phrases, corporate, political, and religious 
groups simultaneously appear to embrace objective science and to raise 
doubt about the scientific fact at issue. The presence of such terms 
should tip the scale in favor of a “yes” answer to Question Five. 
Question Six: Is there any inconsistency in regard to the confidence 
in the fact at issue? 
Doubt is the centerpiece of scientific knowledge fraud. The 
corporate groups that aim to mislead the public about dangers posed by 
their products nearly always seek to sow doubt about the underlying 
science. And although this question overlaps somewhat with Questions 
Three, Four, and Five, it nevertheless should be addressed 
separately.160 By doing so, it forces the trier of fact to zero in on how 
each statement presents the scientific community’s confidence level.  
Consider the following example: assume a BTS on toxicity of lead 
in the human body says, “There is no safe threshold level of lead in the 
body, and any amount, no matter how trace, is considered toxic and 
dangerous to human health.” Now consider that the defendant’s 
statement repeated the BTS, but preceded it with caveat language, such 
as “some scientists believe . . . .” Such caveat language would require 
a “yes” answer to this question. Adding “some scientists believe” to the 
statement raises doubt about how confident scientists are regarding the 
dangers of lead poisoning. As a result, a reader of the BTS would come 
away with a materially different impression than a reader of the 
defendant’s statement, which is precisely what falsity hinges on.161  
Question Seven: Does the defendant’s statement question, criticize, 
discredit, or belittle the scientific community, the scientific 
community’s opinion, or individuals or organizations within the 
scientific community? 
159 Henricksen, supra note 15, at 350. 
160 As such, in considering this question, courts should keep an eye out for cautionary 
terms and phrases, such as those discussed above in Question Five. 
161 United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ommon-law fraud 
includes acts taken to conceal, create a false impression, mislead, or otherwise deceive in 
order to ‘prevent[] the other [party] from acquiring material information.’” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (AM. LAW INST.1977))); see also KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 40, at 737 (“Any words or acts which create a false impression covering up 
the truth, or which remove an opportunity that might otherwise have led to the discovery of 
a material fact . . . are classed as misrepresentation, no less than a verbal assurance that the 
fact is not true.”). 
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One of the most effective ways to mislead the public about science 
is to attack the scientists themselves. This has been done by the tobacco 
industry,162 the fossil fuel industry,163 the asbestos industry,164 and 
many others who have misrepresented the science behind their 
dangerous products.165 For instance, the fossil fuel industry and those 
working on behalf of its interests frequently allege that climate 
scientists who concur with the scientific community’s consensus on 
climate change (climate change is real and humans are causing it) do 
so to secure grant funding,166 further their careers,167 or stay within the 
pack, thereby representing a sheep mentality among scientists.168 
Industries have also tried to question, criticize, discredit, or belittle 
scientists by attempting to show that scientists are either baffled by 
their own data or do not know if what they are saying is actually true.169 
Attacks on the integrity, morals, or competency of an opponent has 
proven as effective, if not more effective, than other kinds of persuasion 
techniques.170 Scientific knowledge fraud defendants also attempt to 
do so to avoid directly contradicting the scientific community’s 
opinion. The effect on the audience is nevertheless the same. By 
criticizing the scientists, companies cast doubt about the authorities 
162 See, e.g., ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 4; Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, supra note 
4. 
163 See, e.g., ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 4, at 1–9; Penn, supra note 3. 
164 See BRODEUR, supra note 4; Brickman, supra note 4; Gelinas, supra note 4. 
165 These include, for instance, pesticides, see McCabe, supra note 4; Freudenburg et 
al., supra note 4, leaded gas, see Nriagu, supra note 4; Kitman, supra note 4, and fracking-
produced oil and gas, see van de Biezenbos, supra note 4; Peeples, supra note 4. 
166 See, e.g., Henry Payne, Global Warming: Follow the Money, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 25, 
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/414359/global-warming-follow-
money-henry-payne (publishing in the politically active conservative magazine, the 
National Review, which made a number of false and unsubstantiated assertions, including 
that “[i]n truth, the overwhelming majority of climate-research funding comes from the 
federal government and left-wing foundations. And while the energy industry funds both 
sides of the climate debate, the government/foundation monies go only toward research that 
advances the warming regulatory agenda. With a clear public-policy outcome in mind, the 
government/foundation gravy train is a much greater threat to scientific integrity.”). 
167 Id. 
168 See John Timmer, If Climate Scientists Are in It for the Money, They’re Doing It 
Wrong, ARS TECHNICA (May 30, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://arstechnica.com/science/2016/05/ 
if-climate-scientists-push-the-consensus-its-not-for-the-money/. 
169 See, e.g., Bob Ellis, Some Scientists “Baffled” by Lack of Global Warming, DAKOTA 
VOICE (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.dakotavoice.com/2009/11/some-scientists-baffled-by-
lack-of-global-warming; Timmer, supra note 168. 
170 See, e.g., Richard R. Lau & Ivy Brown Rovner, Negative Campaigning, 12 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 285, 295 (2009) (noting that recent U.S. presidential elections strongly 
support the fact that negative campaigning works, and adding that this “mantra among 
political practitioners . . . has reverberated throughout the scholarly literature as well”). 
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behind the valid scientific knowledge, giving the audience (often, the 
public at large) a flawed perception on the matter. Accordingly, if the 
defendant’s statement questions, criticizes, discredits, or belittles 
individuals or organizations within the scientific community—no 
matter how gently or subtly—the court should answer “yes” to this 
question. 
Question Eight: Does the defendant’s statement overstate, misstate, 
or misrepresent a controversy in any way that may exist with regard to 
the fact at issue? 
Overstating, misstating, or misrepresenting a controversy is a very 
common practice among companies aiming to mislead the public about 
science.171 For example, the fossil fuel industry (and its allies) have 
repeatedly represented that there are sides to the debate, which casts 
doubt on whether humans are causing global warming. In truth, 
however, at least ninety-seven percent of climate scientists agree that 
humans cause global warming, primarily through CO2 emissions.172 In 
fact, a recent study clarified that not a single scientist within the three 
percent who disagreed actually represents valid, objective scientific 
interests.173 In that study, researchers attempted to replicate the results 
of the three percent, which is a common way to test scientific 
studies.174 One of those researchers noted that “[e]very single one of 
those analyses had an error—in their assumptions, methodology, or 
analysis—that, when corrected, brought their results into line with the 
scientific consensus.”175 Accordingly, in order to be truthful, 
companies who represent that there are two sides to a scientific debate 
must clarify that the overwhelming majority—perhaps ninety-seven 
percent—land on one side of this “debate.” And this debate has been 
settled for at least twenty years.176 
171 See, e.g., ORESKES & CONWAY, supra note 4. 
172 John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in 
the Scientific Literature, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr.–June 2013, at 1, 2, http://iopscience. 
iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/2/024024/pdf. 
173 See generally Rasmus E. Benestad et al., Learning from Mistakes in Climate 
Research, 126 THEORETICAL & APPLIED CLIMATOLOGY 699 (2016); Katherine Ellen 
Foley, Those 3% of Scientific Papers That Deny Climate Change? A Review Found Them 
All Flawed, QUARTZ (Sept. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1069298/the-3-of-scientific-papers-
that-deny-climate-change-are-all-flawed. 
174 See Foley, supra note 173. 
175 Id. (quoting Katharine Hayhoe, FACEBOOK (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.facebook. 
com/katharine.hayhoe/posts/1915202578704620). 
176 See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 132; O’Grady, supra note 131. 
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While some companies falsely purport scientists are debating an 
issue, other companies simply invent a controversy when there is no 
valid scientific controversy at all. For instance, scientific evidence 
establishes that Earth is about 4.5 billion years old,177 and widespread 
scientific consensus supports this estimate.178 Yet, some groups still 
reject this view in favor of the so-called “Young Earth theory,” which 
holds that Earth was created just a few thousand years ago.179 
Similarly, although Earth is certainly round, in recent years, a number 
of groups have theorized that Earth is flat.180 In each of these cases, 
although a tiny fringe group holds a conflicting view on the scientific 
knowledge, the scientific community is not conflicted on that 
knowledge.181 Any company who makes a statement referencing 
something as objectively false as the Young Earth theory or the Flat 
Earth theory should clearly state that neither one is a scientific theory 
at all, but rather a nonevidence-based idea held by a small number of 
individuals who reject the evidence. Because such an idea has no 
serious scientific evidentiary support, any statement about such a 
theory that omits this caveat would be highly misleading. 
Accordingly, if the defendant’s statement overstates, misstates, 
misrepresents, or invents in any way a controversy that may or may not 
exist with regard to the fact at issue, the court should answer this 
question “yes.” 
In summary, courts should answer the following eight questions in 
regard to each allegedly false statement: 
177 See, e.g., Age of the Earth, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20051223072700/http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/geotime/age.html (last updated Oct. 9, 1997); G. 
Brent Dalrymple, The Age of the Earth in the Twentieth Century: A Problem (Mostly) 
Solved, 190 GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y LONDON 205 (2001). 
178 See Age of the Earth, supra note 177. 
179 See, e.g., WHY INTELLIGENT DESIGN FAILS: A SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF THE NEW 
CREATIONISM 1–2 (Matt Young & Taner Edis eds., 2004). 
180 See, e.g., Cassandra Santiago & A.J. Willingham, Dear Doubters, B.o.B Wants to 
Prove the Earth Is Flat Once and for All, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/25/us/b-o-b-
flat-earth-gofundme-trnd/index.html (updated Sept. 26, 2017, 9:40 PM) (discussing rapper 
B.o.B’s plan to launch satellites into space to prove Earth is flat); Mark Shanahan, Kyrie
Irving Talks Flat Earth Yet Again, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.boston
globe.com/lifestyle/names/2018/02/16/kyrie-irving-talks-flat-earth-yet-again/wfCbvn
76Z23tjQ3uX0ssXL/story.html.
181 What Controversy: Is a Controversy Misrepresented or Blown Out of Proportion?, 
U.C.: UNDERSTANDING SCI., http://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/0_0_0/sciencetoolkit_06
(last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
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(1) At the time of the representation, does the defendant have an
economic, political, ideological, or religious motive to make a
statement inconsistent with the opinion of the scientific
community?
(2) Is the evidentiary support, if any, underlying the defendant’s
representation biased?
(3) Does the defendant’s statement misstate or misconstrue the
scientific authority it purports to rely on?
(4) Does the defendant’s statement contain any words or phrases
that make its statement mean something different than the
baseline truth statement?
(5) Does the defendant’s statement, taken as a whole, present the
fact at issue in a manner inconsistent with the baseline truth
statement?
(6) Is there any inconsistency in regard to the confidence in the fact
at issue?
(7) Does the defendant’s statement question, criticize, discredit, or
belittle the scientific community, the scientific community’s
opinion, or individuals or organizations within the scientific
community?
(8) Does the defendant’s statement overstate, misstate, or
misrepresent in any way a controversy that may exist with
regard to the fact at issue?
These eight questions are meant to supplement, not supplant, the 
court’s analysis of whether the defendant’s statement was false. Under 
this framework, the answer with regard to ExxonMobil’s 2000 
statement that “scientists remain unable to confirm” that humans are 
causing global warming182 is clearly “yes” to at least seven of the eight 
questions. As a fossil fuel company, ExxonMobil clearly has an 
economic motive to counter the scientific knowledge that its product is 
causing global warming. Therefore, ExxonMobil’s statement satisfies 
the first question. Even though ExxonMobil cites to two scientific 
authorities, a National Research Council report and a Sargasso Sea 
Temperature chart, to support its statement, it is unclear whether either 
of these authorities are given as direct support for the statement at issue. 
Accordingly, the second question, regarding evidentiary support, is 
inconclusive. However, the third question should be answered “yes” 
182 ExxonMobil Advertorial, supra note 62. 
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because ExxonMobil misrepresented the two authorities it cited.183 
ExxonMobil’s statement uses a word or phrase (“unable to confirm”) 
describing the fact at issue (the scientific certainty on global warming) 
that makes the statement mean something different from the BTS, 
satisfying the fourth question. Further, ExxonMobil’s statement, taken 
as a whole, presents the fact at issue in a manner inconsistent with the 
BTS. The BTS makes clear that CO2 emissions are likely causing 
global warming, while ExxonMobil’s statement makes this proposition 
appear uncertain or even unlikely. This satisfied the fifth question. 
The confidence level in the fact at issue as portrayed by 
ExxonMobil’s statement (“scientists are unable to confirm”) is patently 
inconsistent with the confidence level of the BTS (“CO2 is 
accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities” 
and “increases in CO2 concentrations are virtually certain to be due to 
fossil fuel emissions”), satisfying the sixth question. The seventh 
question is likewise satisfied because it calls into question scientists’ 
ability to establish the fact at issue. This is a close call, however, and 
could conceivably come out the other way since the slight against the 
scientific community is rather subtle in this statement. The eighth 
question is easily met because ExxonMobil’s statement portrays the 
question of human-caused global warming as unestablished or in 
183 ExxonMobil’s reliance on the National Research Council’s report is disingenuous. 
That report confirmed the IPCC’s assessment that global warming is happening and that 
humans are causing it while acknowledging that some uncertainties remain, as is common 
in science. ExxonMobil, on the other hand, cherry-picked two conclusions addressed in the 
report and presented those conclusions as support for the notion that scientists were still 
uncertain about whether warming was even happening. See Leading Climate Scientists 
Advise White House on Global Warming, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED. 
(June 6, 2001), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID= 
10139; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 117. 
The second authority ExxonMobil relies on, the chart on page 95 with the heading 
“Sargasso Sea Temperature,” is even more misleading. ExxonMobil purports the chart 
shows declining global temperatures. However, the underlying data does not pertain to 
global temperatures at all. Dr. Lloyd D. Keigwin, who created the chart, was so angry 
ExxonMobil misrepresented his work that he wrote a letter stating that “no responsible 
scientist” would use that chart to represent global temperatures, and he added, “I believe 
ExxonMobil has been misleading in its use of the Sargasso Sea data. There’s really no way 
those results bear on the question of human-induced climate warming . . . . [T]he sad thing 
is that a company with the resources of ExxonMobil is exploiting the data for political 
purposes . . . .” Letter from Lloyd D. Keigwin, Senior Scientist, Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Inst., to Peter Altman, Nat. Coordinator, Campaign ExxonMobil (Dec. 11, 2000), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040621170714/http://www.campaignexxonmobil.org/pdf/ 
KeigwinLetter.pdf.; see also Cindy Baxter, ExxonMobil, Funder of Climate Change 
Deniers, HUFFPOST (Dec. 1, 2015, 9:25 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/cindy-
baxter/exxonmobil-funder-of-clim_b_ 8684320.html (updated Dec. 1, 2016). 
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controversy, while the truth of the matter at the time the statement was 
made was that there was a vast consensus on the question, and any 
contrarian views represented only a tiny minority of scientists, many of 
whom were tied to the fossil fuel industry.184 
The framework set out in this Part is meant to guide courts in 
determining whether a defendant’s statement misrepresented 
knowledge held by the scientific community at the time the statement 
was made. If it did, it should fulfill the falsity element of a fraud claim 
under the proposed fraud-falsity standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For far too long, industries like Big Tobacco, Big Oil, and Big 
Pharma have gotten away with misleading the public about the dangers 
posed by their products. Misrepresentations of scientific knowledge are 
on the rise, not only in private industry but in the public sector as well. 
Our own government has, under the current administration, taken a 
sharp anti-science turn, giving a green light to many industries to 
further mislead the public about the products they mine, manufacture, 
and sell. 
Implementing the fraud-falsity standard discussed in this Article 
should help level the playing field by giving plaintiffs a firmer legal 
ground upon which to bring fraud actions against those who lie about 
the science behind their products. There are, however, other hurdles 
faced by plaintiffs in fraud cases concerning scientific knowledge. 
Imagine a homeowner whose house is damaged by sea level rise 
bringing a fraud claim against a fossil fuel company for causing the 
harm. The falsity element would certainly be of great concern. But so 
would the elements of intent, reliance, reasonableness of the reliance, 
and causation.  
Accordingly, although those harmed by misrepresentations 
pertaining to the link between products and the harm they cause should 
be able to bring a fraud action, there remain several significant barriers 
to doing so. The falsity element, however, need not be one of them. 
Courts should not throw up their arms, as Justice Scalia did, and say, 
“We’re not scientists.” That excuse only allows corporate, political, 
and religious groups to continue lying to the public without recourse. 
Profiting through deception is precisely what the law of misrepresen-
tation was put in place to punish. Unless courts are able to apply the 
elements in cases where the public is misled with regard to scientific 
184 See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 132; O’Grady, supra note 131. 
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knowledge, those spreading the lies will continue to not only get away 
with it but profit hand over fist from it. 
